

schaftlich tragende Säulen der Provinz Groningen gewesen sind. Anlaß zur Gründung habe die Armutsbewegung unter den Mönchen des 12. Jahrhunderts gegeben; zu dieser *vita apostolica* hätten wir uns eine größere Ausführlichkeit gewünscht. Auch die beigegebenen Karten kämen mit einer Einzeichnung der übrigen und benachbarten Klöster erst zur Geltung.

Das Erzdiakonat Friesland war kirchlich gesehen nicht unbedeutend: 319 Pfarreien in 13 Dekanaten, meist Propsteien genannt, davon 6 in Groningen, 7 östlich der Ems, also in Ostfriesland. Hier hatte sich das Eigenkirchenwesen, ungeachtet dessen, daß es seit dem Laterankonzil 1175 abgeschafft war, in gemilderter Form erhalten. Die Zahl der Klöster aus den Mönchs- und Ritterorden ist mit 45 nicht gering gewesen (S. 34). Zumeist stammten die Konventualen aus der Stadt und den Ommelanden (116); im allgemeinen waren die *kloosters redelijke bevolkt*. Neue Geistesströmungen wie die der Bursfelder Kongregation oder der *Devotio moderna* drangen kaum durch; aber ein normales und gesundes Klosterleben scheint immer wieder ein Durch- und Überstehen der wirren Zeiten ermöglicht zu haben. Die Mönche waren Spezialisten in Land- und Deich- und Schleusenbau sowie in der Viehzucht; die 4 Bücher entstanden in und trotz der bösen Zeit eines 40jährigen Krieges. Die Klöster waren ein stabilisierender oder wenigstens bremsender Faktor gegen die eingesessene Anarchie, gemeinhin „Friesische Freiheit“ genannt (S. 30. 180).

Schade nur, daß der Autor den guten Eindruck, den sein Werk auf Historiker machen wird, mit einer auf zwei Seiten ins Deutsche übersetzten Zusammenfassung gründlich verwischt. Er fragt da: „Wurden die Klöster geehrt; wurde ihre gesellschaftliche Rolle anerkannt? Oder wurden sie akzeptiert, weil sie nun einmal die stärkere Partei waren? . . . Man könnte sich vorstellen, daß die Ordensleute ihre Glaubwürdigkeit verloren haben durch die Rolle, die die Äbte in den schwierigen Anfangsjahren der allgemeinen Unruhen spielten.“ Auf solche ideologische Aufhänger verzichten wir gern; sie waren nicht die Leisterne über der Forschungsarbeit des Verfassers; sie werden es auch nicht sein, wenn er, wie wir herzlich wünschen, seine gründliche Arbeit fortsetzt.

Siegburg

Rhaban Haacke

Wilhelm Kölmel: *Regimen Christianum. Weg und Ergebnisse des Gewaltverhältnisses und des Gewaltverständnisses (8. bis 14. Jahrhundert)*. Berlin (de Gruyter) 1970. XII, 661 S., geb. DM 98.—

This massive volume represents the fruit of forty years' labour on the political theory of the fourteenth-century Church, and, whilst the book does in fact cover a much wider field, the long section dealing with the period between 1300 and 1350 remains its focal point and should perhaps be read first. Like others before him, Dr. Kölmel fully appreciates that one of the fundamental problems of interpretation involved when discussing the views of ecclesiastical writers of this period is the need to determine whether there was any inner consistency in the attitudes they adopted towards the secular power, and it is one of the merits of this book that it deliberately sets out to deal with this immensely difficult question. Should the attempt to accommodate inherently contradictory positions within a single framework of ideas be regarded as the ultimate triumph of the medieval synthesis, or does analysis merely serve to confirm that there was a confused welter of conflicting principles affording further evidence of the decline of the medieval Church? What part did Aristotelianism play in this process? Did it undermine and eventually destroy the traditional Augustinian conception of a divine world order, or did it do no more than reinforce an inevitable human tendency to react against the harsh extremes of early medieval theory – something which had already become apparent by 1200 and now required only to be confirmed and consolidated? Given that there was a secularisation of society and outlook in the later Middle Ages, does this represent an essentially new trend, or would it be more accurate to regard it as merely a shift of emphasis from one side to another of an always accepted *via*

*media*? In a sense it is almost necessary to determine the answers before the evidence can be examined, because the standpoint adopted may well predetermine the way in which the historian decides to treat the authors concerned. If there is a prior assumption of the existence of a generally recognised system of mutual co-operation and interdependence between the two powers, lay and papal, one has to do no more than consider each writer in turn to gauge the extent to which he accepted or deviated from this established mean. On the other hand, a modern critic will derive little benefit from a person by person account if he has a predisposition to view the political thought of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as a process which involved the grinding together of antagonistic schools of thought, and which took place within the minds of the thinkers themselves as much as between groups and institutions. Here perhaps only a strictly thematic treatment can serve to avoid excessive repetition. Kölmel has clearly had great difficulties in this respect, and has tried to cope with the problem by trying to combine both methods of presentation. This juxtaposition can be illuminating at times. But too frequently it allows the virtues of each method to cancel each other out, and suggests to the reader that there is a basic confusion in the interpretation of the material.

Kölmel begins, reasonably enough, with the proposition that there was general agreement during the medieval period on the need for society to be a *populus christianus* and, as such, to be governed by a *rex fidelis*. But, he argues, by the thirteenth century ecclesiastical writers were torn between the conflicting ideals of a monarchic one-power system, developed in favour of the pope as *rex-sacerdos*, and a double hierarchy of spiritual and temporal powers with their own distinctive spheres of operation. Following canonistic precedents, the former conception of an 'eklesiarch-solustistischen Doktrin' leading to 'monothetic monism' came to predominate with writers from the religious orders – a process which makes Bonaventure of greater significance than Aquinas – until a climax was reached in the period from the 1320s to the 1350s with the savagely anti-imperial polemics of the opponents of Marsilius and Ockham, echoed by popes like John XXII and Clement VI. In this there would be an almost complete spiritual takeover of the natural order of lay government, making temporal power into a mere appendage 'annexed' to spiritual power, and saved from total absolutism only by a continuing insistence that papal intervention into secular affairs should be for a just cause and a preference for spiritual authority to remain an indirect function rather than a direct and regular wielding of both swords. Even with a hierocratic high point like *Unam sanctam*, one must be careful not to overstate either its novelty or its significance. These hesitations do, moreover, indicate that an alternative solution was already available in the form of the *regimen christianum*, a composite term developed by James of Viterbo but perhaps best illustrated by Aegidius Romanus, which rejected the 'ecclesiarchal' or 'integralist' assumption that the natural order ought to be enveloped and blanketed by the divine order, and restored the temporal sphere as something existing in its own right as a gift of God. In short, there was not to be a single Christian government of the world, but a naturally-justified government plus a Christian or sacerdotal potency based on the superiority of grace over nature and requiring to be made actual only when necessary for the purposes of salvation. Thus the great achievement of the fourteenth century was rather that it solved the problem of sovereignty by producing a *doppelbewegung*, a dual means of actualising power in the Christian society by harnessing nature and supernature together into a system of interlocking rulerships, which rendered obsolete the mutually self-cancelling positions of papal and imperial extremists. From now on a king could be seen as a prince approved by God in that he was the representative of an earthly *civitas*, but who was also 'regenerated' by papal confirmation and could accordingly take pride in claiming to be a truer king as ruler over a Christian community, even if he remained subject to a degree of overriding papal supervision (to be elaborated at a later date by Bellarmine and Suarez). Somewhat oddly, Augustinus Triumphus makes a brief appearance as an exponent of this double-

sided solution, although Kölmel clearly regards the interminable contradictions of a writer like Alvarus Pelagius as a more authentic guide to the meaning of Christian rule. The reader may feel that an ability to contradict oneself should not be confused with the capacity to construct a clever synthesis.

Far more controversial however is the attempt to make Innocent III, as heir to the 'double polarisation' of the Decretists, into a precursor of the *regimen christianum* school. According to this interpretation Innocent accepted the principle of a dual relationship with the emperor in which at one level empire and papacy operated independently as separate entities, whilst on the higher level of divine justice the pope had a supreme competence *ratione peccati* in particular cases. But his *plenitudo potestatis* was something far short of total power, and the lay ruler generally had the actual exercise of the temporal sword – yet another in Kölmel's enormous collection of examples of the Bernardine distinction between a sword in use and in its sheath. As Anibaldus de Anibaldi put it later in the thirteenth century, inferiority does not involve total dependence: 'inferior non totaliter dependeat a superiore'. But the mere piling up of texts is not sufficient substitute for a more penetrating discussion of whether the lay power had the use of the sword as a matter of right or only by virtue of a *favor apostolice sedis*, just as there is a vast theoretical difference between Innocent's view of the papal exercise of casual jurisdiction in imperial matters as a convenient administrative arrangement and the much more restrictive notion of these 'certain cases' as the extreme limit of the pope's legal competence. Similarly, when Aristotelianism is only mentioned half a dozen times and Aquinas rates only a small part of a chapter, it is far from clear whether Kölmel really appreciates the difference between Augustinian and Aristotelian versions of the natural order. Writers in both traditions recognised that civil communities developed naturally: the crucial question was the value to be attached to this natural social capacity. A papalist struggling to express the hierocratic idea in terms of the Aristotelian formulae which he had learnt in the schools is not necessarily an exponent of a middle way between the competing claims of faith and reason. Kölmel is rightly concerned with the question of whether late medieval papalism should be seen as a logical, essentially simple system which was being undermined and eaten away by constant contact and conflict with antagonistic lay theories, or whether notions of dualism and Aristotelian naturalism made as much headway as they did precisely because the papal theory itself was more uncertain and partial than is sometimes thought – hence his distinction between the 'ecclesiarchal thesis' and the 'hierocratic doctrine', and laborious disquisitions on, for example, the difference between two swords and both swords, which leave one in little doubt as to which interpretation he himself prefers – but the number of its adherents is never the best way of testing the validity of a political principle in a medieval context.

But leaving the papacy aside, it is suggested here that an additional merit of the *regimen christianum* notion is that it was equally capable of dealing with the clash between 'monothematic and polythematic structures of power ordering' apparent in lay theory ever since Gelasian 'mundaneity' – the acceptance of spiritual authority as co-existent in the *mundus* with royal power – provoked an ideological confrontation during the earlier medieval period. On the one hand this would eventually produce the regal-imperial conception, proclaimed by Henry IV and Frederick Barbarossa, of a perverted Gelasianism in the form of a spiritual-temporal 'Dyokephalie' or double vicariate of Christ. On the other side, however, the lay writer, bedevilled by the old Decretist question 'A quo ergo habet, si a domno papa non habet imperium?', and denied the opportunity to return to a more traditional imperial priestly-kingship, could find an effective means of escape from this thoroughly unsatisfactory position only in the direction of complete secularism, a 'restaurative-instantaneous temporality' which would put lay government on an essentially natural, non-divine basis. Despite the appallingly cumbersome terminology which Kölmel has created to express his distaste for currently used expressions (a

subject discussed at some length), no one would seriously dispute his point that there was a fatal ambivalence in imperial propaganda, which became very marked by the early fourteenth century, and which the French publicists like John of Paris had already avoided by adopting a far more radical nationalistic attitude. Apart from the peculiarity of dealing with writers like Olivi, Peter de la Palu and Hervaeus Natalis under the heading of 'nicht-ekklesiarche Doktrin', this section, from the Ghibelline theory of empire through Dante and Marsilius to Ockham, is probably the best in the book. Kölmel again underlines the significance for lay government of the argument that power is 'a Deo sed per homines', and might have applied this also to the papacy, which one sometimes forgets was just as much an elective monarchy as the emperorship: there would have been scope for more consideration of the constitutional aspects of this, not least the growth of the paradox that sovereignty was an absolute power limited by its own purpose, which was to be of paramount influence in the early modern period. But no summary can adequately cover the whole range of issues raised here, such as the growth of the national sovereign state idea and its connection with the concept of the *corona* or *status regni*, the problem of the universality of the medieval empire, or the development of the related notions of tyranny and *epiekeia* (although neither of these feature in a very poor index). The most striking omission is the absence of any assessment of the contribution made by the Roman lawyers: we shall find nothing about Baldus, Bartolus, Cino or Lucas da Penna, and Kölmel appears to be unaware of the work of scholars like Maffei. Overall, this is at best little more than competent textbook stuff, and there are occasions when one wonders whether the purpose of the first part of the book was not just to revise Walter Ullmann's *Die Machtstellung des Papsttums im Mittelalter* (of which, significantly, the title is more often than not given wrongly) to bring it more into line with numerous publications during the last twenty years on the political theory of the canonists. The style is pedestrian, the tone didactic, and there is a lack of the feeling of excitement and exhilaration which ought to carry us from one elaborately numbered and cross-referenced sub-section to the next. No doubt it is true enough that this or that *was* said, but more selection and less familiarity might have provided the sparkle that is absent from the indigestible wastes of interminably reiterated points. At the end it is difficult not to ask where we have got to that we were not before. We have a new set of terms, but the material contents are no more than might have been gleaned from a diligent study of recent literature, listed in a huge but not very accurate bibliography.

London

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Angelus Albert Häußling: *Mönchskonvent und Eucharistiefeier. Eine Studie über die Messe in der abendländischen Klosterliturgie des frühen Mittelalters und zur Geschichte der Meßhäufigkeit (= Liturgiewissenschaftliche Quellen und Forschungen 58). Münster (Aschendorff) 1973. XIV, 380 S., kart. DM 74,-.*

„Ohne Absicht“, weil bereits vorgenommen als das Werk Otto Nußbaums erschien (Kloster, Priestermonch und Privatmesse, ihr Verhältnis im Westen von den Anfängen bis zum hohen Mittelalter – Theophaneia 14, Bonn 1961), stellt sich diese Studie ihm gegenüber (343). Als These Nußbaums wird angegeben: „Kloster, Priestermonch und Privatmesse stellen eine klare Stufenfolge dar: im ursprünglich laikalen Mönchskloster wächst die Zahl der Priestermonche aus inneren und äußeren Gründen an, und aus Frömmigkeit beginnen die Priestermonche „privat“, ohne Interesse an einer anwesenden Gemeinde, Messen zu zelebrieren; das führt dann zur Vermehrung der Altarzähl und einigen anderen Änderungen (Neuordnung des klösterlichen Tagesverlaufs u. ä.), mit denen den technischen Schwierigkeiten abgeholfen wird. Hauptmotiv ist die typisch germanisch-irische Heilsangst, die im häufigen Gebrauch der Heilsgabe Hilfe sucht“ (342).