

# Ecumenical Processes in the mid 13<sup>th</sup> Century

## And the First Union between Russia and Rome

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In evaluating the union between Duke Daniel Galitsky and Rome, researchers usually write that the Duke's main objectives at that time were to receive help from the West in resisting the Mongol-Tatars and to raise his international status to „king“ of Rus'. However, the chronicler clearly indicates that it was his mother's persuasion which became the most important argument in favor of Daniel's difficult decision. To understand the role of Grand Duchess Romanova, it is vital to consider the meeting between the Duke of Galicia-Volyn and the Pope in a broader historical context. This, of course, was not only the result of the Catholic Western influence, but of the impact of the Orthodox East as well.

### Euphrosiniya of Galicia and the Coronation of Duke Daniel Romanovich in 1253

The account of the Galicia-Volyn chronicle devoted to the coronation of Daniel of Galicia and the conclusion of the Church's union with Rome makes mention of the Duke's mother. According to the chronicler, it was she who managed to persuade her son, who had repeatedly rejected the proposal of the coronation and the union of churches, to agree to the Pope's proposal: „Он же однако не хотел, и убедила его мать, и Болеслав, и Земовит, и польские бояре [...]“ („But he did not want to, and his mother, and Boleslav and Zemovit and Polish nobles persuaded him [...]“)<sup>1</sup>. His mother's influence on Daniel's decision was so great that the chronicler ranks it among the main reasons for the Duke's consent. The chronicle claims that it exceeded the influence of the Polish allies, who promised military aid against the Tatars in support of this union.

How can this crucial role played by the Duke's mother be explained in the history of relations between Daniel and Rome? What prompted Grand Duchess Romanova,

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<sup>1</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'*, ed. Aleksej A. Shahmatov, St Petersburg 1998 (*Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisej* II), 827.

who was quietly living out her last years in a monastery, to enter the political scene for the last time and loudly raise her voice after many years of complete silence? The important role of the Duchess of Galicia-Volyn, though it was repeatedly pointed out by historians, remains unexplored, and the reasons why she supported the union and the coronation of her son have not been fully understood. Although certain attempts were made to discover the Duchess's motives, they have produced contradictory results. According to Mychajlo S. Grushevs'kyj, Daniel's mother advocated the union with Rome, for she „as a Catholic princess, could not but welcome the prospect of obtaining a royal title“.<sup>2</sup> I. Gralya thought that the Galician dowager duchess, as one of the remaining supporters of Orthodoxy, supported the coronation as it was in the interests of her Greek relatives – the powerful clan of the Kamatir, who supported the Nicaean Emperor's attempts to conclude the union with the Pope.<sup>3</sup> What made Daniel listen to his mother and accept her arguments? This question also remains unanswered: researchers confine themselves to general observations about the Duchess's extraordinary personal authority and the great respect in which she was held by all the Romanovichi.<sup>4</sup> Assessing the role played by the Duchess of Galicia-Volyn in the history of the union between Daniel and Rome is not facilitated by the well-established idea that the Duke's main objectives at that time were to receive help from the West against the Mongol-Tatars and raise his international status as the „king“ of Rus'.<sup>5</sup> In the context of these goals, the duchess-mother's involvement in the coronation looks like a superfluous detail. Meanwhile, the chronicler clearly indicates that it is his mother's persuasion that became the most important argument in favor of Daniel's difficult decision. To understand the role of Grand Duchess Romanova, it is vital to consider relations between the Duke of Galicia-Volyn and the Pope in a broader historical context. This, of course, was not only the result of the Catholic Western influence, but of the impact of the Orthodox East as well. Unfortunately, in spite of several centuries of dominant Byzantine influence in Rus', the role of the latter is underestimated by present day authors. The role of the Orthodox East is either completely ignored or recognized as nominal, with no real significance. Many authors tend to generally discuss how, after the loss of Constantinople in 1204, the rulers of the Byzantine (Nicaea) Empire sought support from the West, agreeing in exchange to the union of churches and the rule of the Pope over the Christian world. For example, Nilolaj F. Kotljars writes: „In these circumstances, Daniel's coronation could not cause particularly negative reactions in Nicaea“.<sup>6</sup> It is true that Nicaean

<sup>2</sup> Mychajlo S. Grushevs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy III*, Kiev 1993, 72.

<sup>3</sup> Hieronim Grala, *Drugie małżeństwo Romana Mścisławicza*, in: *Slavia Orientalis* 31 (1982), 115–127.

<sup>4</sup> See: Dariusz Dąbrowski, *K istorii drevnerusskoj knjazheskoj sem'i (otnoshenija mezhdru vzroslymi det'mi i ih roditeljami v rode Romanovichej, galicko-volynskoj vetvi Rjurikovichej)*, in: *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta*, Serija 2: *Istorija* 3 (2005), 3–19, here 11.

<sup>5</sup> Nikolaj F. Kotljars, *Daniil, knjaz' Galickij*, St Petersburg 2008, 290; Oleksandr B. Golovko, *Korona Danila Galyc'kogo. Volyn' i Galychyna v derzhavno-politychnomu rozvytku Central'no-Shidnoji Jevropy rann'ogo ta klasychnogo seredn'ovichchja*, Kiev 2006, 346f.; Leontij Vojtovych, *Korol' Danylo Romanovych. Polityk i polkovodec'*, in: Zorjana Lyl'o-Otkovych (ed.), *Doba korolja Danyla v nauci, mystectvi, literaturi*, Lviv 2008, 22–97, here 89.

<sup>6</sup> Nikolaj F. Kotljars, *Daniil, knjaz' Galickij* (see note 5), 290f.

influence has not been considered as a factor in Daniel Galitsky's foreign policy. The only work devoted to the significance of Daniel's coronation for Russian-Byzantine relations consists of a short article by Meletij M. Vojnar, published in 1955. According to the historian, the coronation meant complete independence from Byzantium for the Galicia-Volyn principality. Daniel was certainly aware of the fact that receiving the crown from the Pope removed him from the Byzantine world hierarchy and transferred him to the Western system of church-political structure, „in the orbit of the Western concept of kingdom“, with all its legal consequences. The union the Duke agreed to meant the breakdown of church relations with Byzantium.<sup>7</sup> Meletij M. Vojnar's ideas were developed by Ivan V. Paslavskij. According to him, Daniel Romanovich, by deciding to accept the crown from the Pope, opposed the policy of the Nicaean Empire aimed at subjecting Russian principalities to the Horde. In contrast, the Duke of Galicia-Volyn sought allies in the West, especially in the person of the Roman Pontiff. The coronation, according to the historian, was for Daniel an „escape from Byzantium to the West.“<sup>8</sup>

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It should, however, be noted that the negotiations regarding Daniel's coronation and the union with Rome took place against the background of broader church-political processes accompanied by regular contact between Nicaea and the Holy See in the mid-1240s – mid-1250s. This fact was correctly emphasized by Vladimir T. Pashuto.<sup>9</sup> Recently, the issue has been raised again by Boris N. Florja.<sup>10</sup> However, in most studies on the history of relations between Western and Eastern churches, the involvement of the Duke of Galicia-Volyn, as well as that of other Russian dukes, in the ecumenical processes in the mid-13th century remains unnoticed,<sup>11</sup> and is sometimes even denied: Walter Norden, for example, writes:<sup>12</sup> „The talks about the union of Innocent IV with Russian dukes Alexander of Novgorod (1248) and Daniel of Galicia

<sup>7</sup> Meletij M. Vojnar, *Korona Danyla v pravno-politychnij strukturi Shodu (Vizantii)*, in: Athanasij G. Velykyj (ed.), *Korona Danyla Romanovycha, 1253–1953*, Rom–Paris–München 1955 (*Zapysky Naukovogo tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* 164), 116f.

<sup>8</sup> Ivan Paslavskij, *Koronacija Danyla Galyc'kogo v konteksti politychnyh i cerkovnyh vidnosyn XIII stolittja*, Lviv 2003, 71f.

<sup>9</sup> Vladimir T. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi*, Moscow 1950, 261–263.

<sup>10</sup> Boris N. Florja, *U istokov religioznogo raskola slavjanskogo mira (XIII vek)*, St. Petersburg 2004, 161f.

<sup>11</sup> See: Wilhelm de Vries, *Innozenz IV. (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten*, in: *OS* 12 (1963), 113–131; Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy. 1198–1400*, New Brunswick 1979, 88–95; Antonino Franchi, *La svolta politico-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio (1249–1254)*, Rome 1981; Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, London 1989; Michael Angold, *Church and society in Byzantium under the Comneni, 1081–1261*, Cambridge 1995, 505–529; Aphrodite Papayianni, *Aspects of the Relationship Between the Empire of Nicaea and the Latins, 1204–1254*, London 2000; Michael Angold (ed.), *Eastern Christianity*, Cambridge 2006 (*The Cambridge History of Christianity* 5), 53–61.

<sup>12</sup> Walter Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz. Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung bis zum Untergange des byzantinischen Reiches*, Berlin 1903, 362.

(1247 onwards), which then continued under Alexander IV until 1257, have nothing to do with the history of Byzantine union.“ First of all, there is no doubt that the people of Galicia-Volyn Rus’ were well informed about contact between Nicaea and Rome concerning the possible union between the churches. Moreover, from the chronicle’s account it follows that this contact was the precondition for Daniel’s negotiations on acceptance of the papal crown and the conclusion of the church union. The Chronicle’s account of the Duke’s coronation mentions recognition of the „Greek faith“ by Pope Innocent IV and his promise to convene a general council to unite the churches: „Innocent also condemned those who blasphemed the Greek Orthodox faith, and wanted to summon the council of the true faith to reunite the churches.“<sup>13</sup> According to Boris N. Florja, the information about the forthcoming union of churches reached Galicia-Volyn Rus’ via Hungary. The wife of the Hungarian king, Béla IV, was the daughter of the Nicaean emperor Theodore I Lascaris. In the mid-1240s, she played an important role in establishing contacts between the Pope and the Bulgarian king Koloman Asen I (1241–1246).<sup>14</sup> It is probable, as Florja believes, that the Pope’s message sent in 1245, in which he expressed his willingness to convene a general council with the participation of Greek and Bulgarian clergy to resolve all thorny issues<sup>15</sup> was delivered to Bulgaria through her mediation. From our perspective, the Dukes of Galicia-Volyn were able to keep close contact with the Nicaean rulers. The basis for the direct relationship between Kholm authorities and Nicaea might have been the position and family ties of the „Grand Duchess Romanova“, the daughter of the Byzantine emperor Isaac II.<sup>16</sup> Euphrosiniya of Galicia was closely related to the ruling dynasty Lascaris in Nicaea, and obviously could not remain distanced from their foreign policy, the main goal of which was to regain Constantinople. The Nicaean emperor John III Vatatzes (1222–1254) started offensive action against the Latin Empire. Of significant importance was his victory at Pymanion in 1224, which resulted in the Empire losing all its possessions in Asia Minor. In quick succession, John III conquered the islands of Lesbos, Rhodes, Chios, Samos and Kos, greatly weakening the influence of Venice in the Aegean Sea.<sup>17</sup> To continue its offensive, the Nicaean Empire needed military allies. One emerged for a while in the 1230s in the form of the Bulgarian tsar Ivan Asen II (1218–1241), with whose support Vatatzes managed in 1234 to capture a foothold in Thrace for the subsequent regaining of Byzantine possessions in the Balkans.<sup>18</sup> In the late 1230s, the German emperor Frederick II (1220–1250) became Vatatzes’ new ally. Their union was prompted by the death of the Latin emperor John de Brienne (1229–1237), Frederick II’s father-

<sup>13</sup> Ipat'evskaja letopis' (see note 1), 827.

<sup>14</sup> Boris N. Florja, U istokov religioznogo raskola (see note 10), 162.

<sup>15</sup> See: Ivan Dujchev, Borislav S. Primov (eds.), Latinski izvori za blgarskata istorija IV, Sofia 1981, 91.

<sup>16</sup> See: Alexander V. Maiorov, Doch' vizantijskogo imperatora Isaaka II v Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi. Knjaginja i monahinja, in: Drevnjaja Rus'. Voprosy medievistiki 1 (2010), 76–106.

<sup>17</sup> See: Michael Angold, A Byzantine government in exile: Government and society under the Laskarids of Nicaea. 1204–1261, Oxford 1975, 197f.

<sup>18</sup> See: Petr I. Zhavoronkov, Nikejsko-bolgarskie otnoshenija pri Ivane II Asene (1218–1241), in: Zinaida V. Udal'cova (ed.), Vizantijskie ocherki. Trudy sovetskih uchenyh k XV Mezhdunarodnomu kongressu vizantinistov, Moscow 1977, 195–209.

in-law, with whom the latter had maintained peaceful relations.<sup>19</sup> In 1244, Vatatzes married Frederick's daughter Constance, who took the name of Anna in Nicaea.<sup>20</sup> Frederick II inherited the idea of imperial power as the unlimited, God-given power of Roman emperors.<sup>21</sup> Because of this, his attitude towards the Latin Empire established under the auspices of the Pope was hostile. The German Emperor sought to eliminate this state as an illegal instrument of papal influence in the East.<sup>22</sup> Drawing on an alliance with the German Emperor and taking advantage of a weakened Bulgaria following the death of Ivan Asen II, Vatatzes continued conquests in the Balkans, and in 1246 annexed the territory in Northern Thrace and Macedonia along with the cities of Adrianople and Thessalonica, as well as part of the kingdom of Epirus. These successes put an end to the empire of Thessalonica, whose rulers were unwilling to submit to the power of Nicaea.<sup>23</sup> The alliance of Frederick and Vatatzes posed a serious threat to the Apostolic See. Announcing the Emperor's dethronement at the meeting of Council of Lyon on July 17, 1245, Innocent IV (1243–1254) pointed to the many atrocities of Frederick, who had been excommunicated twice before. Among them, along with insulting church bishops, negligence to the church building and acts of mercy, personal immorality and organizing the assassination of Duke Ludwig of Bavaria, he mentions an „ungodly alliance“ with Muslims and the „Greek schismatics“. This last accusation referred to the marriage between Frederick's daughter and Vatatzes.<sup>24</sup> Realizing the danger of the union between the German and the Nicaean emperors, the Pope put a great deal of effort into sowing discord between them. To this end, the Pope tried to persuade Vatatzes to negotiate a union with Rome in exchange for a promise to return Constantinople to the Greeks.<sup>25</sup> In autumn 1247, the Pope's ambassador monk-Minorite (Franciscan) Lawrence, who was appointed as legate in Greece, Armenia, Iconium and Turkey, came to Nicaea. As far as we can judge by the papal bull which he delivered *Censuram ecclesiasticam debitum* on August 3, 1247, addressed to „the patriarchs, archbishops and bishops of the East“, and the two papal letters to Lawrence, dated August 7 of that year, the

<sup>19</sup> Petr I. Zhavoronkov, Nikejskaja imperija i Zapad (vzaimootnoshenija s gosudarstvami Apenninskogo poluostrova i papstvom), in: Vizantijskij vremennik 36 (1974), 111. – For more details see: Michael B. Wellas, Griechisches aus dem Umfeld Friedrich II, München 1983; Franz Tinnfeld, Byzanz und die Herrscher des Hauses Hohenstaufen (1138–1259), in: ADipl 41 (1995), 105–127.

<sup>20</sup> Aiphonse Huillard-Bréholles (ed.), Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi. Sive constitutiones, privilegia, mandata, instrumenta quae supersunt istius imperatoris et filiorum ejus; accedunt epistolae paparum et documenta varia VI/1, Paris 1861, 147; Matthaei Parisiensis, monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica majora IV, ed. by Henry R. Luard, London 1877 (Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores LVII), 299.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander A. Vasil'ev, Istorija Vizantijskoj imperii. Ot nachala Krestovyh pohodov do padenija Konstantinopolja, St Petersburg 1998, 198.

<sup>22</sup> Petr I. Zhavoronkov, Nikejskaja imperija i Zapad (see note 19), 112.

<sup>23</sup> See: François Bredenkamp, The Byzantine Empire of Thessalonike (1224–1242). Thessalonike, 1995.

<sup>24</sup> Ludwig Weiland (ed.), Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum II, Hannoverae 1897, 508–512. See also: Aiphonse Huillard-Bréholles (ed.), Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi VI/ I (see note 20), 325; Annales Placentini Gibellini a. 1154–1284, ed. by Ph. Jaffé, in: Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores XVIII, Hannoverae 1863, 491.

<sup>25</sup> Johannes Haller, Das Papsttum: Idee und Wirklichkeit IV, Stuttgart 1953, 262.

main purpose of the legate was to meet patriarch Manuel II (1244–1254) and to inform him of Innocent IV's desire to unite the churches on conditions favorable to the Greeks.<sup>26</sup> Brother Lawrence belonged to the inner circle of the pontiff. Fra Salimbene di Adam, monk-Minorite of Parma, the author of an extensive chronicle devoted to the policy of the Holy See and the history of Italy in the mid-13th century, mentioned him as a friend referring to the year 1251. After a time, on his return from Nicaea, Innocent IV appointed Lawrence Archbishop of Antivari.<sup>27</sup> It is noteworthy that Lawrence succeeded another Minorite, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, who held the Cathedral of Antivari at the turn of the decade 1240–1250.<sup>28</sup> Nicaean authorities willingly accepted the Pope's offer. After the reconquest of Thessalonica in 1246, Vatatzes feared the Latin response. According to contemporary accounts by Matthew of Paris, the Latin emperor Baldwin II (1228–1261) travelled to France and England, enlisting Crusaders to defend Constantinople and return the land annexed by Vatatzes.<sup>29</sup> From the chronicle by Salimbene di Adam it is also known that in March 1249, Nicene ambassador monk Salimbene (namesake of the chronicler), who spoke both Greek and Latin, arrived in Lyon to visit the Pope. He brought letters from Vatatzes and patriarch Manuel requesting that John of Parma, Minister General of the Order of St. Minorites, who had unquestioned moral authority in the West and in the East, be sent to Nicaea to engage in further negotiations.<sup>30</sup> The letters of Innocent IV to John III Vatatzes and patriarch Manuel that the Pope sent to Nicaea with the embassy of John of Parma are dated May 28.<sup>31</sup> In late 1249, shortly after the arrival of the delegation of John of Parma in Nicaea, a church council was held in Nymphaion (now Kemalpaşa, Il Izmir, Turkey), at which Emperor John III Vatatzes proposed recognition of papal *plenitudo potestatis* in exchange for the Pope's refusal to send assistance to the Latin powers in Constantinople. However, during the discussions which followed considerable difficulties were caused by the problem of filioque, added by the Roman church in the Nicene-Constantinople Creed, which claimed that the Holy Ghost proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son. Nicephorus Vlemid, mentor of the future emperor Theodore II, one of the greatest Byzantine theologians of the 13th century, condemned the Latin position.<sup>32</sup> The contradictions between the two churches on the issue of filioque still remain unresolved.<sup>33</sup> At

<sup>26</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno post Christum natum 1198 ad anno 1304 II*, Berolini 1875, 1065, nr. 12630, 12636, 12637. – Full text of document, see: Luke Wadding (ed.), *Annales Minorum seu trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum auctore... III*, Romae 1732, 174–176 (Anno Chr. 1247, nr. 8–10).

<sup>27</sup> *Chronica fratris Salimbene de Adam*, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger, in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores XXXII*, Hannoverae 1913, 419.

<sup>28</sup> Natalija P. Shastina, *Puteshestvija na Vostok Plano Karpini i Gil'oma Rubruka*, in: *Puteshestvija v vostochnye strany Plano Karpini i Rubruka/Natalija P. Shastina* (ed.), Moscow 1957, 3–20, here 8.

<sup>29</sup> *Matthaei Parisiensis Historia Anglorum, sive, ut vulgo dicitur, Historia Minora III*, ed. by Frederic Madden, London 1869 (*Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores XLIV*), 24f.

<sup>30</sup> *Chronica fratris Salimbene de Adam*, 304f., 321.

<sup>31</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum II*, 1122–1123, nr. 13385, 13386.

<sup>32</sup> Nicephorus Blemmydes, *Autobiographia sive curriculum vitae*, ed. Joseph Munitiz, Leuven, 1984, 67–73.

<sup>33</sup> For more details see: Alexandra Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft mit Konstantinopel. Patriarch Johannes XI. Bekkos als Verteidiger der Kirchenunion von Lyon (1274)*, Wiesbaden 2003, 51–54.

the beginning of 1250, a message composed by Patriarch Manuel II was conveyed to Pope Innocent IV containing the proposal to convene a general council to resolve all disputes. The Nicaean delegation sent to the council was granted unrestricted authority and the patriarch pledged to recognize all the decisions of this council.<sup>34</sup> But, the Greeks stubbornly refused to accept the addition of filioque to the Creed unless it was proved by Scripture or by any *divinum oraculum*. The Pope only expressed the hope that the Greeks would one day recognize the truth of the Romans and for this he was ready to recognize the ecumenical status of the Greek patriarchate.<sup>35</sup> After successful negotiations in May 1250, the delegation of John of Parma returned to Rome accompanied by the Pope's ambassadors, who delivered letters from Vatatzes and Manuel.<sup>36</sup> However, the ambassadors could not proceed further to Lyon since they were detained by Emperor Frederick II, who was not pleased with Vatatzes' contact with the Pope, hence delaying the Nicaean representatives' arrival in Lyon until the early spring of 1251.<sup>37</sup> For Vatatzes, negotiating with the Pope did not constitute breaking relations with Frederick. On the contrary, the Nicaean Emperor continued to support his father-in-law in his confrontation with Innocent IV. In 1248, Vatatzes sent Friedrich a large sum of money and in spring of 1250 provided significant military force.<sup>38</sup> The death of Frederick II on December 13, 1250 led to a radical change in the alignment of political forces in Europe. Frederick's successor, the German and Sicilian king Conrad IV (1250–1254) was hostile towards the Nicene Emperor. The breakdown between them occurred when Conrad drove out the Italian family of Lancia (maternal relatives of Empress Anna, wife of John III Vatatzes), who were forced to flee to Nicaea.<sup>39</sup> Under these circumstances, supported by the Pope, Latin emperor Baldwin II again began to muster forces to fight Vatatzes and for this purpose he went to the West to recruit crusaders. Simultaneously, Innocent IV sent his ministers to call for a campaign against Nicaea.<sup>40</sup> In the end, Vatatzes had to agree to resume negotiations on the unification of churches. During the second half of 1253, the Nicaean Emperor sent a new envoy to Rome consisting of two metropolitans, George of Kizik and Andronicus of Sardinia, and the abbot of the monastery Aksey Arsenios Autoreianos who would become the future patriarch of Constantinople, and gave the ambassadors broad powers in negotiating the terms of the union. This envoy is mentioned by Theodore Skutariot in his notes to the history written by George Akropolites.<sup>41</sup> The letter of Patriarch Manuel to Pope Innocent IV, and that of Pope Alexander IV to Bishop Constantine of Orvieto lays down the conditions of the union suggested by the representatives of Nicaea. These were: the return of

<sup>34</sup> Antonino Franchi, *La svolta politico-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio* (see note 11), 167–179.

<sup>35</sup> Antonino Franchi, *La svolta politico-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio* (see note 11), 193–215.

<sup>36</sup> *Chronica fratris Salimbene de Adam* (see note 27), 662.

<sup>37</sup> Walter Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (see note 12), 325.

<sup>38</sup> Petr I. Zhavoronkov, *Nikejskaja imperija i Zapad* (see note 19), 114. – See also: Benoît Grévin, *Une lettre latine de l'empereur Frédéric II à Jean III Vatatzès désattribuée: à propos de la missive Ex illa fidelitatis regula – baculo te castiget*, in: *Byzantion* 79 (2009), 150–168.

<sup>39</sup> Charles Diehl, *Figures byzantines II*, Paris 1908, 219f.

<sup>40</sup> Petr I. Zhavoronkov, *Nikejskaja imperija i Zapad* (see note 19), 114.

<sup>41</sup> *Georgii Acropolitae Opera I*, eds. by August Heisenberg, Peter Wirth, Stuttgart 1978, 290f. See: Michael Angold, *A Byzantine government in exile* (see note 17), 82f.

Constantinople, the restoration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the departure of Latin clergy from Constantinople. In exchange, the Nicaean party agreed to recognize the primacy of the Pope in church affairs, his right to convene ecumenical councils and chair them, to take the oath of the Orthodox clergy, and finally conceded that the Emperor was obliged to carry out all the decrees of the Pope, if they were not contrary to the sacred canons.<sup>42</sup> The Nicene emissaries were seized by Conrad IV and reached Rome only in the early summer of 1254.<sup>43</sup> However, continuing negotiations soon proved impossible because of the death of their main participants: Emperor John III Vatatzes died on November 3, 1254, and his death was followed a month later, on December 7, by that of Pope Innocent IV. The new Nicaean emperor, Theodore II Lascaris (1254–1258), was brought up according to Aristotle's ideas and believed that a ruler's main duty was to serve his people – the Greek nation – for the sake of whom he must make any sacrifice.<sup>44</sup> Theodore stressed the superiority of Hellenic culture and Greek faith over the Latin faith, supported Greek philosophers and theologians, held religious disputes at his court, and awarded victory in these discussions to his countrymen.<sup>45</sup> Like Frederick II, Theodore II considered the emperor's power to be higher than that of the pontiff. He suggested to the new pope, Alexander IV (1254–1261), that talks should be resumed about union based upon the churches' equality and the domination of the emperor over them.<sup>46</sup>

### The Struggle between Nicaea and Constantinople and the Foreign Policy of the Dukes of Galicia-Volyn

The beginning of negotiations between the Dukes of Galicia-Volyn and the Apostolic See on the church union and Daniel's coronation coincides with the resumption of negotiations on uniting Western and Eastern churches. These negotiations were held on the initiative of the Pope with the authorities of Nicaea and Bulgaria, and their most active stage took place in the late 1240s – early 1250s.<sup>47</sup> The question of the union with Rome was discussed almost simultaneously in Nicaea and Galicia-Volyn Rus' during the negotiations conducted by two Minorites close to Innocent IV – Lawrence and John (Giovanni da Pian del Carpine). In the autumn of 1245 the latter,

<sup>42</sup> Georg Hofmann, Patriarch von Nikaia Manuel II. und Papst Innozenz IV, in: OCP XIX (1953), 67–70. – See also: Fritz Schillmann, Zur byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV. (1254–1261), in: RQ XXII (Freiburg 1908), 115–119.

<sup>43</sup> Walter Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz (see note 12), 367.

<sup>44</sup> Dimitar Angelov, Imperial ideology and political thought in Byzantium (1204–1330), Cambridge 2007, 204f.

<sup>45</sup> Michael Angold, Church and society in Byzantium (see note 11), 527f.

<sup>46</sup> Petr I. Zhavoronkov, Nikejskaja imperija i Zapad (see note 19), 116.

<sup>47</sup> See: Vitalien Laurent, Le pape Alexandre IV (1254–1261) et l'Empire de Nicée, in: EOr (1935), 30–32; Johannes Haller, Das Papsttum IV (see note 25), 261f.; Wilhelm de Vries (see note 11), Innozenz IV. (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten, 113–131; Daniel Stiernon, Le problème de l'union gréco-latine vue de Byzance. De Germain II a Joseph Ier (1232–1273), in: Michael Mollat (ed.), 1274. Année charnière: mutations et continuités. Colloque international, Paris, 1977, 148–152.



traveling through South-Western Rus' while on his way to Mongolia, met Duke Vasilko Romanovich, bishops and nobles and read to them the Pope's letter on „the unity of the Holy Mother Church“.<sup>48</sup> Continuing his journey the following spring, Carpine met Daniel himself returning from the Horde somewhere in the steppes of the Don. On his way back from Mongolia to Lyon in June 1247, the papal envoy visited Galicia-Volyn Rus' again, met Daniel and Vasilko, and the bishops and „people worthy of respect“ who confirmed that „they desire lord pope to be their father and master and the Holy Roman Church to be their mistress and teacher“.<sup>49</sup> Between 1246 and 1248, there was regular correspondence between Innocent IV and the Russian dukes, indicating continuing mutual contact.<sup>50</sup> Shortly after returning from the Horde, Daniel Romanovich sent his envoy Abbot Gregory – whose name is mentioned in the Pope's letter of September 13, 1247 – to the Archbishop of Mainz, and Archchancellor of the Holy Roman Empire, Siegfried III von Eppstein, to Lyon.<sup>51</sup> Władysław Abraham shows Gregory to be the Abbot of St. Daniel monastery in the vicinity of Ugrovsk.<sup>52</sup> In June 1247, the Dukes of Galicia-Volyn probably sent another emissary to Lyon, who arrived there simultaneously with the delegation of Pian del Carpine.<sup>53</sup> The Pope's talks with the rulers of Nicaea and Galicia-Volyn Rus' were conducted and reached their climax almost simultaneously. The Pope's envoy, Abbot Opizo of Mezzano, met Daniel in Krakow at the end of July 1253,<sup>54</sup> but he failed to obtain the Duke's prompt consent to the coronation and the union of churches, as Daniel hesitated for several months. In autumn, the papal representatives came to Russia.<sup>55</sup> The exact date of the coronation is unknown. The most likely is believed by Władysław Abraham to be December 1253.<sup>56</sup> Mychajlo S. Grushevs'kyj argued that Daniel's coronation took place in the last months of 1253.<sup>57</sup> Mykola Chubatyj

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<sup>48</sup> Giovanni di Pian di Carpine, *Storia dei Mongoli* IX. 3, eds. by Enrico Menestò and Claudio Leonardi, Spoleto 1989, 304.

<sup>49</sup> Giovanni di Pian di Carpine, *Storia dei Mongoli* (see note 48), 330 (IX. 48).

<sup>50</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1025, nr. 12093–12098, 1067, nr. 12668–12669, 1069, nr. 12688, 1076, nr. 12775, 1078, nr. 12814. – See the full documents: Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta* I, St Petersburg 1841, 57–62, 65–68, nr. 62–65, 67–69, 74, 76, 77.

<sup>51</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1069, nr. 12689. – See the full document: Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta* I (see note 50), 66, nr. 75.

<sup>52</sup> Władysław Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi I*, Lviv 1904, 122.

<sup>53</sup> See: Günther Stökl, *Das Fürstentum Galizien-Wolhynien*, in: Manfred Hellmann (ed.), *Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands I/1*, Stuttgart 1981, 520–524; Sophia Senyk, *A history of the Church in Ukraine I: To the End of the Thirteenth Century*, Rom 1993, 432–439; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1224–1410*, Harlow 2005, 94–97, *Anti Selart*, *Livland und die Rus im 13. Jahrhundert*, Köln 2007, 208–214. – See also: Vitalij Nagirnyj, „Curientes tuis votis annuere“: Kto był inicjatorem rokowań między książętami halicko-wolyńskimi a stolicą apostolską w polowie lat 40-ch XIII wieku?, in: *Drogichin 1253. Materiały Mizhnarodnoji naukovoji konferenciji z nagodi 755-i richnici koronaciji Danyla Romanovycha*, Ivano-Frankivs'k 2008, 134–141.

<sup>54</sup> Bronisław Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś, 1194–1340*, Warszawa 1966, 145.

<sup>55</sup> Mychajlo S. Grushevs'kyj, *Hronol'ogija podij Galyc'ko-Volyns'koji litopysy*, in: *Zapysky Naukovo tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* 41 (Lviv 1901), 36f.

<sup>56</sup> Władysław Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji kościoła I* (see note 52), 134.

<sup>57</sup> Myhajlo S. Grushevs'kyj, *Hronol'ogija podij* (see note 55), 36f.

thought that this event took place after the new year of 1254,<sup>58</sup> Vladimir T. Pashuto dated the coronation the same year (about 1254).<sup>59</sup> Regardless, it is evident that the papal embassy, headed by legate Opiza, waited almost half a year for Daniel Romanovich's decision to accept the royal insignia granted to him by the Roman Pontiff and give his consent to the union of churches. It was during the second half of 1253, when negotiations on the terms of the coronation and church union were held in Krakow and then in Kholm, that the ambassadors, authorized to conclude the union on terms previously agreed upon by both parties, were sent from Nicaea to Rome. Daniel's coronation ceremony was delayed for half a year, and the papal ambassadors, who delivered the crown, waited patiently for the opportunity to fulfill their mission. Apparently, the delay can be explained by the fact that Kholm court was expecting news from Nicaea, confirming the final agreement of terms of the union with Rome, and sending authorized representatives to conclude a treaty with the Pope. Apparently this was due to the participation of the Russian Orthodox clergy in the coronation. According to chronicle of Galicia-Volyn, Daniel took the crown „from his father Pope Innocent and all his bishops“.<sup>60</sup> From the outset, the Russian clergy was involved in the negotiations with Rome. According to Pian del Carpine, the Dukes Daniel and Vasilko discussed the Pope's proposals which his bishops had brought.<sup>61</sup> In our opinion, the need for direct contact with the Nicaean authorities at this time, which was so important to world politics and the fate of the Eastern church, explains a trip to Nicaea by Daniel Romanovich's close associate Kirill who was chosen by the Duke of Galicia-Volyn as a candidate for the post of Kievan Metropolitan. In 1246, on his way to Nicaea, he reached Hungary, where he carried out another order by Daniel to become a mediator in the negotiations on the marriage between Daniel's son Lev and King Béla IV's daughter Constance. For his assistance in concluding the marriage, Béla promised Kirill to see him off „at Gorka with great honor“.<sup>62</sup> Kirill seems to have successfully fulfilled his mission in Nicaea, confirming Duke Daniel Galitsky's willingness to strictly follow the objectives of the foreign policy pursued by the Nicaean court. His reward was his promotion by the patriarch to the post of Kiev Metropolitan Kirill. It was as such that he returned to Russia before moving to Suzdal.<sup>63</sup> Along with the diplomatic efforts of the papal curia, Nicaean diplomacy played a significant role in promoting negotiations on the church-political union of East and West. An important tool of this diplomacy included the basileuses' dynastic ties with the rulers of European states. The wife of the Hungarian king Béla IV, Maria Laska-

<sup>58</sup> Mykola Chubatyj, *Zahidna Ukraïna i Rym u XIII st. u svojih zmagannjah do cerkovnoji uniji*, in: *Zapysky Naukovogo tovaristva imeni Shevchenka* 123–124 (Lviv 1917), 60.

<sup>59</sup> Vladimir T. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi* (see note 9), 259. – Nikolaj F. Kotlyar dates coronation October – November 1253 (Nilolaj F. Kotljjar, *Kommentarij*, in: Nilolaj F. Kotljjar (ed.), *Galicko-Volynskaja letopis': Tekst. Kommentarij. Issledovanie*, St Petersburg 2005, 294.

<sup>60</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'* (see note 1), 827.

<sup>61</sup> Giovanni di Pian di Carpine, *Storia dei Mongoli* (see note 48), 328 (IX. 44).

<sup>62</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'* (see note 1), 809. – On the appointment of Kiev Metropolitan Kirill cm see: Petr I. Zhavoronkov, *Nikejskaja imperija i knjazhestva Drevnej Rusi*, in: *Vizantijskij vremennik* 43 (1982), 84f.; Roman A. Sokolov, *Obstoitel'stva postavlennija pervogo russkogo po proishozhdeniju mitropolita Kirilla*, in: *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Serija 2: Istorija* 4 (2006), 3–7.

<sup>63</sup> *Lavrent'evskaja letopis'*, ed. Evgenij F. Karskij, Leningrad 1927, 472.

rina, the sister of Vatatzes' first wife Irene, contributed to diplomatic efforts by establishing contacts between John III Vatatzes and Pope Innocent IV. We can judge the mediation efforts of the Hungarian queen from the information contained in the bull of Innocent IV *Quod dominum lesum* which was addressed to her and is dated January 30, 1247.<sup>64</sup> The Pope thanked Maria for her „sincere desire“ to promote the reunification of the churches. The letter also mentions the arrival in Rome of two brother Minorites sent by the Queen, who „with joy and enthusiasm“ talked about her „persistent endeavors to return Vatatzes and his people to the bosom of the mother church“. In response, the Pontiff offered to send ambassadors to Nicaea immediately, choosing for this purpose „prudent and wise men“, so that they could finally convince Vatatzes to agree to the union.<sup>65</sup> The Pope's ambassador, monk-Minorite Lawrence, arrived in Nicaea that year. Mediation by the Byzantine Princess Maria, wife of the Hungarian King, thus led to resuming direct contacts between the Nicaean Emperor and the Pope and to the beginning of negotiations on the church union.

In light of this data, it becomes possible to explain an initially unexpected fact: that the chronicle account of Daniel's coronation features his mother, Byzantine Princess Euphrosiniya-Anne, as one of the main figures whose arguments, as mentioned, persuaded the Duke to accept the crown from the Pope. The Duchess of Galicia-Volyn must have been in touch with her relative in Hungary (Maria of Hungary was Euphrosiniya's great-niece) and been aware of her mediation in talks of Nicaea with Lyon and Rome. The Duchess' interference in Daniel's affairs, at such a crucial moment, could hardly have been due to some pro-Rome attitude or the desire to help her son to acquire the royal title (at least, we know nothing about this from the sources). This interference, in our opinion, was mainly determined by the political interests of Nicaea, whose main objective remained the recovery of Constantinople and the restoration to the Byzantine Empire of its previous borders in the Balkans. In order to achieve this, all means were used and any sacrifice was considered justified. Euphrosiniya of Galicia obviously did not remain indifferent to the aspirations of her fellow countrymen, and therefore applied all her influence to urge Daniel to adhere to Nicaean policy. Adherence to Nicaean foreign policy also manifested itself in the Duke of Galicia-Volyn's relations with the German emperor Frederick II, whose help John III Vatatzes relied on for a long time in the struggle for Constantinople. Daniel Romanovich's active involvement in Austrian affairs, which began in the second half of the 1230s, as noted by Vladimir T. Pashuto, can be rightly associated with the alliance, which was forming at the same time, of Nicaea with Emperor Frederick.<sup>66</sup> The emergence of the Nicaean-German alliance can be dated as far back as 1237. The creation of the alliance, though it was not directly reflected in sources, was post factum confirmed by numerous pieces of evidence. Pope Gregory IX (1227–1241) condemned it in March 1238 as he was extremely concerned about Frederick's inten-

<sup>64</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1049, nr. 12406.

<sup>65</sup> Augustin Theiner (ed.), *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia maximam partem nondum I*, Romae 1859, 203, nr. 377.

<sup>66</sup> Vladimir T. Pashuto, *Vneshnjaja politika Drevnej Rusi*, Moscow 1968, 257.

tion to return Constantinople to Vatatzes.<sup>67</sup> As early as the spring of 1238, Nicaean troops were fighting in Italy on the side of the Emperor.<sup>68</sup> Frederick II was a mediator in the relations of Nicaea with the Latin Empire and the patron of the Greek Church in southern Italy.<sup>69</sup> In 1238, the Emperor forbade the Crusader army led by Baldwin II, who opposed Vatatzes, to trespass through his lands, and closed the ports of southern Italy to them.<sup>70</sup>

The rhymed chronicle by Philip Muske, Bishop of Tournai, preserves the information that contact between the German Emperor with the Nicaean ruler began in 1237 when Vatatzes offered to plead his liege, in exchange for a promise from Frederick II to free Constantinople and drive the Latin emperor Baldwin II back to France.<sup>71</sup> The conclusion of the strategic alliance between Vatatzes and Frederick coincides with the beginning of the Romanovichs' Austrian epic, during which the Dukes of Galicia-Volyn maintained regular contact with the German Emperor. The first of these communications occurred at the beginning of the same year of 1237. During his stay in Vienna (January – the first half of April 1237), Frederick II met a certain „king“ of Rus', whom the Emperor ordered to pay over five hundred marks in silver through ambassadors, as claimed in the mandate of 15 January 1240.<sup>72</sup> The „king“ of Rus' mentioned in the document could have only been Daniel Romanovich, who was then in Austria.<sup>73</sup> Another meeting of Daniel and Frederick's ambassadors, described in Galicia-Volyn chronicle, was held in Pressburg (Bratislava) in the summer of 1248 or 1249.<sup>74</sup> Acceptance of the royal crown was a difficult decision for Daniel Romanovich. It meant, among other things, obeying Rome in matters of foreign policy, and in any case, recognizing the Pope's role as the supreme arbiter in disputes of Christian rulers concerning land rights. For the Romanovichs, it inevitably entailed the refusal of their due rights to the *Austrian succession* through their mother's side and relinquishing the struggle for the throne of the Babenbergs, which according to the Pope's plans was to be given to other candidates. It is no accident that Daniel's coronation coincides with the departure of his son, Roman Danilovich, from Austria and the breakdown of the marriage between the latter and Gertrude

<sup>67</sup> Walter Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (see note 12), 325.

<sup>68</sup> *Annales Placentini Gibellini* (see note 24), 479.

<sup>69</sup> See: Silvano Borsari, *Federigo II e l'Oriente bizantino*, in: *Rivista storica italiana* LXIII (Torino 1951), 279–291, here 279f.; Peter Herde, *Das Papsttum und die griechische Kirche in Süditalien vom 11. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert*, in: *Deutsches Archiv für die Erforschung des Mittelalters* 26 (1970), 1–46, here 22; Thomas Hofmann, *Papsttum und griechische Kirche in Süditalien in nachnormannischer Zeit (13.–15. Jahrhundert): ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Süditaliens im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter*, Bamberg 1994, 98f.

<sup>70</sup> Aiphonse Huillard-Bréholles (ed.), *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi V/1*, Paris 1858, 181–183.

<sup>71</sup> *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes II*, ed. baron Frédéric A. F. T. de Reiffenberg, Bruxelles 1838, 29855–29860.

<sup>72</sup> Johan Fr. Böhmer, Julius Ficker (eds.), *Regesta Imperii V/1/1*, Innsbruck 1881, 442.

<sup>73</sup> See: Alexander V. Maiorov, *Daniil Galickij i Fridrih Voinstvennyj: russko-avstrijskije otnoshenija v seredine XIII v.*, in: *Voprosy istorii* 7 (2011), 39–43.

<sup>74</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'* (see note 1), 814. – See: Alexander V. Maiorov, *Daniil Galickij i Fridrih Voinstvennyj* (see note 73), 43f.

Babenberg.<sup>75</sup> The Duke of Galicia-Volyn was compensated for these concessions to the Pope by military aid from the Catholic monarchs loyal to the Apostolic See for his opposition to the Tatars, in whom Rome saw a threat to all Christians.

### The Union with Rome and Relations with the Tatars

A few months before his coronation, Daniel Galitsky, who had received the news of the Tatars' preparation for a new attack on the lands of Southern Rus', turned to Innocent IV with several messages calling for help. The texts of these letters have not survived, but we can judge their contents by drawing on the content of the papal bull *Cum ad aliorum*, dated May 14, 1253,<sup>76</sup> which read,

„From the messages of our son beloved in Christ, our son, glorious king of Russiya, who because of the neighborhood with them [The Tatars, A. M.] became aware of many of their secrets, we have learned recently that these Tatars are preparing to destroy all those who, in many places, by the grace of God, managed to escape, and that, until their God stops them, they will violently trample their neighboring Christian lands“.<sup>77</sup>

The Pope then called on „all Christians within the kingdom of Bohemia, Moravia, Serbia and Pomerania“, and „all Christians within Poland“ to mount a new crusade against the Tatars, and in order to organize it he sent his legate – Abbot Opizo of Mezzano. In Regesta of Innocent IV in Vatican Secret Archives, a copy of letters addressed to Czechia and Poland, and dated May 14, 1253 (Reg. orig. vol. II. Ep. 931. p. 308) has survived. According to a postscript, a bull with the same content was sent to Rus'.<sup>78</sup> Athanasij G. Velykyj, referring to another volume of Regesta (Reg. Vat., vol. XXII, nr. 25, pp. 308v-309) published the same text as a bull, addressed to „archbishops, bishops and all Christians in Russia“ and its abridged version as a bull, addressed to „all Christians in Poland“ and dated May 21, 1253.<sup>79</sup>

„Let every Christian carry his cross“, the Pope wrote, spurring on Christians in Central and Eastern Europe for a holy war against the Tatars,

„and follow fully armed the glory sign of the Almighty King [...] And so that nothing would prevent such a salutary case, all those who, inspired by this appeal will take a cross, we will generously give absolution of their sins and grant them with the same privileges as those going to the aid of the Holy Land“.<sup>80</sup>

Another bull of Innocent IV (*Cum te olim*) is dated March 9, 1254, in which he appoints Archbishop Albert Suerbeer as papal legate in Prussia, Estonia and Rus',

<sup>75</sup> See: Alexander V. Maiorov, Rus', Vizantija i Zapadnaja Evropa. Iz istorii vneshnepolitcheskih i kul'turnyh svjazej XII–XIII vv., St Petersburg 2011, 654f.

<sup>76</sup> August Potthast (ed.), Regesta Pontificum Romanorum II, 1232–1233, nr. 14972.

<sup>77</sup> Cited by: Vera I. Matuzova, Elena L. Nazarova, Krestonoscy i Rus'. Konec XII v – 1270 g.: Teksty, perevod, kommentarij, Moscow 2002, 363.

<sup>78</sup> See full document: Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), Historia Russiae Monumenta I (see note 50), 78–79, nr. 88; Augustin Theiner (ed.), Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae I, Romae 1860, 51–52, nr. 107.

<sup>79</sup> Athanasij G. Welykyj (ed.), Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia I, Romae 1953, 43–45, nr. 32.

<sup>80</sup> Cited by: Vera I. Matuzova, Elena L. Nazarova, Krestonoscy i Rus' (see note 77), 364.

and orders him to continue the work of legate Opizo,<sup>81</sup> and in the bull *Attentione vigili debent* of May 19, 1254 the Pope urges archbishop, bishops, and the chapters of the Prussian province, to follow the example of Christians in Czechia and Poland and declare a crusade against the Tatars.<sup>82</sup> Perhaps these efforts can be explained by Innocent IV's sincere desire to support Daniel, and with his help to create a protective barrier against the Tatars in the East of Europe. But we cannot see any tangible signs of military aid to the Duke of Galicia-Volyn from the West. In the 1254–1255 the Romanovichs had to fight Khan Corenza (Kuremsa) virtually single-handed.<sup>83</sup> From the above bull of Pope Innocent IV of May 14, 1253, it is clear that Daniel Galitsky warned Rome of the impending Tatars' attack in advance. Sources did not preserve any information of the Duke of Galicia-Volyn requesting help from the Pope during his fight against Kuremsa. But it is probable that such requests took place and the Duke's demands are reflected in a letter from Daniel's ally, the Hungarian king Béla IV to the Pope, which is dated mid November 1254. Confronted with the real threat of a Tatar attack on his kingdom, Béla bitterly complained about the complete lack of the promised aid by Rome: instead, the people of Germany, the King wrote, attacked his land and he got nothing but words from France. Béla openly threatened to break the alliance with Innocent IV and to submit to the German Emperor – the Pope's enemy – in order to secure the necessary support.<sup>84</sup>

Researchers unanimously claim that it was the Pope's unwillingness or inability to provide the Duke of Galicia-Volyn with real military support in resisting the Tatars' aggression that was the main reason for the break in Daniel Romanovich's relations with Rome.<sup>85</sup>

In the latest literature, it is also commonly believed that this break occurred immediately after the death of Pope Innocent IV, who was favorable to Daniel, and the election of a new pope, Alexander IV, who supported the Lithuanian king Mindaugas. As evidence, the researchers refer to the bull of Pope Alexander *Catholice fidei cultum* of March 6, 1255, in which the Pope grants King Mindaugas and his successors lands of the „Russian kingdom“ occupied by Lithuania.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1256–1257, nr. 15270. – See full document: Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta* I (see note 50), 79–80, nr. 89.

<sup>82</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1265, nr. 15373. – See full document: Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta* I (see note 50), 80–81, nr. 90.

<sup>83</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'* (see note 1), 838–842.

<sup>84</sup> György Fejér (ed.), *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis* IV/1, Budae 1829, 218–224; Augustin Theiner (ed.), *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam* I (see note 65), 227–231, nr. 440. – This letter is dated „Idus nouembris An. Chr. 1254“, but researchers attribute it to 1250 or dated in a broader chronological gap – between 1250 and 1254. – See: Aladar Kovacs, Der „Mongolenbrief“ Belas IV. an Papst Innozent IV. über einem zu erwartenden zweiten Einbruch der Mongolen im 1250, in: *Überlieferung und Auftrag: Festschrift für Michael de Ferdinandy zum 60. Geburtstag*, Wiesbaden 1972, 495ff.

<sup>85</sup> See: Mykola Chubatyj, *Zahidna Ukraïna i Rym* (see note 58), 63; Vladimir T. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi* (see note 9), 259f.; Nilolaj F. Kotljar, Daniil, knjaz' Galickij (see note 5), 291f.; Ivan Paslavs'kyj, *Koronacija Danyla Galyc'kogo*, 78f.; Boris N. Florja, *U istokov religioznoho raskola* (see note 10), 177f.; Oleksandr B. Golovko, *Korona Danyla Galyc'kogo* (see note 5), 349.

<sup>86</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1296, nr. 15721.

It is this pope's message that V. I. Matuza regards as evidence of a breakup of relations between Daniel and the Curia since „the Pope permitted Lithuanian king Mindaugas to fight against the Russian land and the Russian people as the infidels.“<sup>87</sup> According to Ivan V. Paslavs'kyj, in a bull which was sent to the Lithuanian King in March 1255, Alexander IV „approves his [King Mindaugas' A. M.] struggle against Daniel and grants Lithuania Russian lands captured by Mindaugas“.<sup>88</sup> As Oleksandr B. Golovko writes, „The new Pope, Alexander IV, under the pretext of Daniel's intransigence in religious matters, abandoned the promises of his predecessors to have Russia under the protection 'of the throne of St. Peter', and began to incite King Mindaugas to attack Daniel's lands“.<sup>89</sup> Nilolaj F. Kotljar developed this idea further claiming that:

„In a letter dated March 6, 1255, the Pope permitted Mindaugas to capture and plunder Russian lands [...] In order to somehow 'rehabilitate' the Pope, Mykola Chubatyj admits that Alexander IV did not mean the Russian lands of the Romanovichs but of other dukes. But which ones? The papacy even tried to declare a crusade against Galicia-Volyn principality“.<sup>90</sup>

We believe that the content of the bull *Catholice fidei cultum* does not allow such interpretation and shows quite the opposite: the union between South-Western Rus' and Rome still existed, and the lands of Galicia and Volyn were still under the patronage and protection of the Apostolic See. Addressing King Mindaugas, Alexander IV wrote:

„As you have shown us, you are against the Russian kingdom and its inhabitants, who are established in wickedness, with untiring zeal leading a decisive battle, having subjugated some lands of the kingdom. As we hear, the mentioned lands [are] near the heathen and infidel areas that you were [also] easily able to subdue and join to the Christian faith. Heartily giving [our] consent to your requests, we grant you and your heirs by apostolic authority the above lands, but under no circumstances should they be Catholic, this letter confirms [our] patronage“.<sup>91</sup>

As we can see, the Pope, using his authority, did not grant King Mindaugas and his heirs all the lands of the „Russian kingdom“ captured by Lithuania, but only those whose residents „are established in wickedness“ (i.e. who have turned away from the Church of Rome and the Catholic faith). The Pope warns the Lithuanian King that he is granted only schismatics' lands, „but under no circumstances they should be Catholic“. The only land the Pope could have called „Catholic“ lands of the „Russian kingdom“ at the beginning of 1255 was that of Galicia-Volyn Rus. This is proved by the fact that two years later Alexander IV still regarded Daniel Galitsky as one of the

<sup>87</sup> Vera I. Matuzova, Elena L. Nazarova, *Krestonoscy i Rus'* (see note 77), 361.

<sup>88</sup> Ivan Paslavs'kyj, *Koronacija Danyla Galyc'kogo* (see note 85), 82.

<sup>89</sup> Oleksandr B. Golovko, *Korona Danyla Galyc'kogo* (see note 5), 349.

<sup>90</sup> Nilolaj F. Kotljar, *Kommentarij* (see note 59), 295.

<sup>91</sup> „*Cum sicut ex parte tua fuit propositum coram nobis, tu contra Regnum Russiae ipsiusque inhabitatores in infidelitatis devio constitutos indefessa strenuitate decertans, nonnullas terras ipsius regni tuae subiugaveris ditioni, nos attendentes, quod de terras habente praedictas, vicinae paganorum et infidelium regiones de facili poterunt tuo dominio subijci; tuis benigne precibus annuentes, praefatas terras tibi tuisque successoribus, absque Catholicorum quorundam praejudicio, auctoritate Apostolica confirmamus*“ – Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta I* (see note 50), 83, nr. 93. – See also: Augustin Theiner (ed.), *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae I* (see note 78), 60, nr. 123.

„Catholic“ rulers of Rus'. From the copy of the bull *Inter alia que* of February 13, 1257 published by Athanasij G. Velykyj found in the archives of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (APF. Miscellanea. vol. 16. pp. 107–108), it follows that, by addressing the Duke of Galicia-Volyn, the pontiff wished him to „adhere to the Catholic faith, to which he has recently been converted“ (ut persistat in fide catholica, ad quam dudum conversus est); in the same letter, the Pope called Daniel among the „faithful rulers“, „adhering to the Catholic faith“.<sup>92</sup> The Pope's permission to seize Russian lands given to the Lithuanian King in a bull *Catholice fidei cultum* referred, of course, to territory in another part of the „Russian kingdom“ and was aimed against another ruler of Rus' – the Grand Duke of Novgorod and Vladimir Alexander Nevsky, who refused to accept the union with Rome.<sup>93</sup> The bull of March 6, 1255 is among other similar documents demonstrating an open confrontation between Rome and Novgorod in the struggle for lands in the Eastern Baltic region. The most important of them can be considered a series of bulls *Qui iustis causis* of March 11, 1256,<sup>94</sup> in which Pope Alexander IV called on the Catholic clergy of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Gotland, East Germany and Poland to begin preaching a new crusade against the pagans of Vodskaya, Izhorskaya and Karelian lands, i.e. those belonging to Novgorod.<sup>95</sup> The answer was decisive military action, taken by Alexander Nevsky in the same year of 1256.<sup>96</sup> We find no trace of the Duke of Galicia-Volyn's involvement in the confrontation with the Catholic West in the mid-1250s. This fact can clearly be interpreted in favor of preserving the union of South-Western Russia and Rome, which no longer existed in 1255–1256. What, then, could have caused the subsequent break? In our opinion, the reason for this can be found not in the West but rather in the East. The union of Galicia-Volyn Rus' with Rome was part of the ecumenical process, which developed mainly as a relationship of Nicaea with Rome. In this case, for the Russian dukes the position of the Nicaean Emperor was of greater importance than that of the Pope.

### Rejection of the Union by the Nicaean Emperor -Daniel Galitsky's breakup with Rome

In 1256, after a break, the Nicaean-Roman negotiations on the union of churches resumed. The initiative of the talks was launched by Nicaea. Theodore II sent to

<sup>92</sup> Athanasij G. Velykyj (ed.), *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae* 1 (see note 7), 50, nr. 34.

<sup>93</sup> See: Boris Ja. Ramm, *Papstvo i Rus' v X–XV vv.*, Moscow–Leningrad 1959, 175; Eduard Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum I*, Berlin 1960, 104; Oleg F. Kudrjavcev, *Aleksandr Nevskij i papstvo*, in: Anatolij V. Torkunov (ed.), *Aleksandr Nevskij. Gosudar', diplomat, vojn*, Moscow 2010, 159–172 here 171.

<sup>94</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1337, nr. 16289.

<sup>95</sup> See: Albert M. Ammann, *Kirchenpolitische Wandlungen im Ostbaltikum bis zum Tode Alexander Newski's*, Roma 1936, 298f.; Igor' P. Shaskol'skij, *Bor'ba Rusi protiv krestonosnoj agressii na beregah Baltiki v XII–XIII vv.*, Leningrad 1978, 206–209; Anti Selart, *Livland und die Rus im 13. Jahrhundert* (see note 53), 215f.

<sup>96</sup> See: Igor P. Shaskol'skij, *Bor'ba Rusi protiv krestonosnoj agressii* (see note 95), 214–226; John L. I. Fennell, *The crisis of medieval Russia, 1200–1304*, London 1983, 155.



Rome two of his representatives who asked Alexander IV to send a plenipotentiary legate. The basis for new negotiations was to be the conditions previously agreed by John III Vatatzes and Innocent IV. The papal envoy, Constantine of Orvieto, was ready to depart to Nicaea in ten days. The legate received broad powers from the Pope, including the right to convene a church council and chair it as a papal vicar, and the right to change the decisions of the council at his discretion.<sup>97</sup> The embassy of Constantine of Orvieto came to Thessalonica in September 1256, where the Nicaean Emperor was also staying. However, by the time the papal representatives arrived, Theodore II's position on the question of union with Rome had changed dramatically. At the time, the Emperor had led successful military operations in Bulgaria and, apparently under the influence of this success, came to the conclusion that he no longer needed the Pope's support in achieving his primary political objective – the reconquest of Constantinople.<sup>98</sup> Theodore II expressed his new position on the union with Rome in a letter sent to the Pope and cardinals soon afterwards. The Emperor refused to subordinate the Greek church to Rome, favoring only the removal of contradictions between the Western and Eastern churches and the search for a compromise only in matters of Christian doctrine. The Greeks and the Latins, as it was emphasized in the letter, should start a deep and open-minded search for truth together.<sup>99</sup> The change in the previous course taken by Nicaea, aimed at establishing closer relations with Rome, was certainly prompted by strengthening its position in the Balkans. In the midst of negotiations, in September 1256, a magnificent wedding of Theodore II's daughter Mary and Nikephoros Doukas, son of Michael II of Epirus was held in Thessaloniki; patriarch Arsenius Avtorian specifically informed the Pope of this event.<sup>100</sup> This marriage laid the foundations for a military-political alliance between the Nicaean Empire and the kingdom of Epirus – the two most powerful of the Greek states that emerged after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, whose rulers had long competed with each other.<sup>101</sup> As a result, the papal legate did not receive an audience with the Emperor. According to George Akropolites, after Theodore's II departure to the East at the end of October 1256, the Pope's embassy headed for Verrier where it remained until the end of December and then, by the Emperor's order, was to return to Rome.<sup>102</sup> The papal legate was received only by Patriarch

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<sup>97</sup> Fritz Schillmann, *Zur byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV* (see note 42), 115–119. – See also: Alexander A. Vasil'ev, *Istorija Vizantijskoj imperii. Ot nachala Krestovyh pohodov do padenija Konstantinopolja* (see note 21), 219.

<sup>98</sup> Vitalien Laurent, *Le pape Alexandre IV (1254–1261) et l'empire de Nicée*, 43f. – See also: Burkhard Roberg, *Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche auf dem II Konzil von Lyon (1274)*, Bonn 1964, 45f.; Alexandra Riebe (see note 33), *Rom in Gemeinschaft mit Konstantinopel*, 53f.

<sup>99</sup> *Theodori Ducae Lascaris Epistulae CCXVII*, ed. Nicola Festa, Florence 1898, 202–204.

<sup>100</sup> Vitalien Laurent (ed.), *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople I: Les actes des Patriarches. Fasc. 4: Les registes de 1208 a 1309*, Paris 1971, nr. 1332. See also: *Georgii Acropolitae Opera I* (see note 41), 132–134.

<sup>101</sup> See: Donald M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros, 1204–1267*, Oxford 1957.

<sup>102</sup> *Georgii Acropolitae Opera I* (see note 41), 139f. – See also: Jean B. Pappadopoulos, *Théodore II Lascaris, empereur de Nicée*, Paris 1908, 99f.; Michael Angold, *A Byzantine government in exile* (see note 17), 291f.

Arsenius, who strongly emphasized that the issue of the union was the basileus' prerogative. The patriarch sent his ambassadors to the Pope with a letter in which, as in the Emperor's letter, he insisted on the need to overcome only dogmatic differences between the churches.<sup>103</sup> All this, in fact, meant the termination of the union negotiations.<sup>104</sup> The rejection of the union with Rome by the Nicaean Emperor soon triggered a corresponding reaction by the Galicia-Volyn Dukes. This can be concluded from the bull *Inter alia que* by Pope Alexander IV, dated February 13, 1257.<sup>105</sup> Without trying to conceal his irritation, the Pontiff, recalling the recent Daniel Romanovich's conversion to Catholicism, bitterly accused him of violating the oath of allegiance to the Roman church, which he committed despite the benefits he received from it:

„So you, trying to get out of the darkness of unbelief, which blanketed the eyes of your soul, even after you have been reborn in the baptismal font, not without God's inspiration turned in due time to the light of the Catholic faith, without which no one will be saved, and to the obedience to the Church of Rome, promised under oath to obey it, like a true son, and stick to the Catholic faith, like other faithful sovereigns. Therefore the Church, desiring to strengthen you in your faith by its favor and encourage you by good deeds, elevated you to the top of the royal title. We made sure that you were anointed with the oil of the royal anointing, and laid the crown on your head. But you, as has come to our ears, causing our heart-felt concern, having forgotten about both spiritual and secular benefits of the church, disrespected blessings, neglected religion, violating your oath, did not keep your promise to obey the church and to adhere to the faith, which was the risk for your soul, the damage to the faith, negligence to the said church and apostasy from Jesus Christ“.<sup>106</sup>

Such severe criticisms obviously followed the Duke of Galicia-Volyn's rejection of the commitments he took on in respect of the Apostolic See. This refusal, although expressed quite clearly, was brought to the attention of Alexander IV not by Daniel, but through third parties („as has come to our ears“, the Pope wrote). Hence, the Pontiff found it necessary to personally address the Duke with exhortations and warnings about the possible consequences of his apostasy. From the bull *Inter alia que*, it transpires that the Pope accused Daniel not only of violation of the oath of allegiance

<sup>103</sup> Vitalien Laurent (ed.), *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople I/4* (see note 100), nr. 1332.

<sup>104</sup> Daniel Stiernon, *Le problème de l'union gréco-latine vue de Byzance* (see note 47), 151f.; Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy* (see note 11), 98–100.

<sup>105</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum II*, 1370, nr. 16731.

<sup>106</sup> „*Sane tu olim cupiens de infidelitatis tenebris, que postquam etiam renatus fuisti fonte baptismatis oculos tue mentis involverant, ad lumen Catholice fidei, sine qua nemo salvatur, et ad obedientiam Ecclesie Romane non sine divina inspiratione redire, juramento prestitio promisisti, Ecclesie predictae tamquam fidelis ejus filius obedire, ac fidem Catholicam, sicut alii Orthodoxi mundi Principes, observare. Propter quod Ecclesia eadem volens te in sui devotione congruis firmare favoribus, et condignis gratis confovere, personam tuam ad Regalis dignitatis apicem sublimavit, faciendo te inungi sacri crismatis oleo, tuoque imponi capiti Regum diadema. Sed tu, sicut ad audientiam nostram non sine cordis turbatione pervenit, tam spiritualium quam temporalium beneficiorum ipsius Ecclesie immemor, tanteque gratie prorsus ingratus, prestiti juramenti religione contempt, id quod circa obedientiam ejusdem Ecclesie, ac predictae observationem fidei promisisse dinosceris, observare postmodum non curasti, in anime tue periculum, ipsius injuriam fidei, Ecclesie predictae contemptum, et obprobrium Jesu Christi“.*

– Alexander I. Turgenjev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta I*, 84, nr. 95. – See: Athanasij G. Velykyj (ed.), *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae I* (see note 7), 50, nr. 34.

given to Rome, but also of „non-compliance“ with the Catholic faith, „disrespect to blessings“, and „neglect to religion“ which was seen by the Pope as „apostasy from Jesus Christ“. These charges enable us to suggest that, as an excuse to break off relations with Rome, Daniel used dogmatic differences between the Eastern and Western churches which had not been settled in the Nicaean-Roman talks about the union. These differences included the Roman doctrine of filioque, which the Greek Emperor and the Patriarch refused to recognize. Rejection of filioque, as we reckon, gave rise to the charge of apostasy from Jesus Christ. The fact that the question of filioque was of fundamental importance in the relations of Alexander IV with Daniel of Galicia can be proved by words of the Pope addressed to the Russian Duke, revealing the main missionary task of the Apostolic See:

„God does not accept humility, unless it comes from faith; and no business will succeed, unless is associated with spreading and strengthening faith in human hearts, and especially in hearts of kings and princes. So, we must do our best to make sure that together with Christianity spreading throughout the world the Son of Eternal God the Father be more widely worshipped by numerous servants of God“.<sup>107</sup>

These words clearly echo a recent discussion between Roman and Greek theologians about the inclusion of the concept that the Holy Ghost proceeds not only from the Father, but also „from the Son“ – which was created by the Western Church and was not recognized by the Greeks – into the Nicaean-Constantinople Creed (the dogma of the Trinity).

### Break up with Rome and the Change in Daniel Galitsky's Foreign Policy

Alexander IV concludes his letter to Daniel by telling him to return to the bosom of the Catholic Church, sending two of his plenipotentiaries to him:

„In addition, by our letter, we impose an obligation on our venerable brothers, the bishops of Olomouc and Wrocław, to make you do so by church punishment, dismissing the appeal, and to call on the secular power to help them against you. The essence of this is not in conflict with any apostolic charters of any kind of content, which could hinder the action of the message, or disagree with it, and the decision of the two meetings of the general council“.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> „*Verum quia non est Deo acceptum obsequium, quod sine fide prestatur, nec pervenitur operum edificio ad salutem, quod supra firmitatem fidei non consurgit, ad propagandam eam, et corroborandam in mentibus omnium, et specialiter Regum et Principum intentione tota omnique sollicitudine, ac verbi et operis efficacia laborare debemus, ut Christiana Religione latius diffusa per orbem, Patris Eterni filius multiplicatis servitoribus plenius honoretur*“. – Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta I*, 84. – See: Athanasij Velykyj (ed.), *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae I* (see note 7), 50.

<sup>108</sup> „*Alioquin venerabilibus fratribus nostris [...] Olomucensi et [...] Wratislaviensi Episcopis litteris nostris injungimus, ut te ad id per censuram ecclesiasticam, appellatione remota compellant. Non obstantibus aliquibus litteris Aplicis ejuscunq[ue] tenoris existant, per quas effectus presentium impediri valeat vel differri, et Constitutione de duabus dietis edita in concilio generali*“. – Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta I*, 85. – See: Athanasij G. Velykyj (ed.), *Documenta Pontificum Romano-rum historiam Ucrainae I* (see note 7), 51.

As we can see, Alexander IV in fact revoked previous obligations of Rome (*apostolic letters*) in respect of the Duke of Galicia-Volyn, depriving him of the right to appeal, and threatened that in case of failure to follow the oath of allegiance to the Pope, true Apostolic See secular rulers would oppose Daniel. The Pope's reference to the decision of *the general council* apparently means the decision of the First Council of Lyon (1245) about the overthrow of the German emperor Frederick II and, therefore, contains a direct reference to the right of the Church to deny the power of undesirable secular rulers. Two bulls of the same title by Alexander IV, addressed to the bishops of Olomouc and Wrocław, are dated February 13, 1257. A summary of these letters has survived in the papal Regesta. Repeating all his claims to Daniel, the Pope instructs the bishops to apply coercive measures:

„Therefore we order you by this apostolic letter, if the said duke does not fulfill his promise, to force him to this by ecclesiastical court dismissing the appeal and using against the said duke the help of secular authorities“.<sup>109</sup>

The text on the bull *Inter alia que* from the papal Regesta cited by August Potthast enables us to understand which secular rulers were meant here by the Pope as in one version Daniel Romanovich is called „vassal of the Hungarian king“ (*ut Danielem regem Russiae (rubrae ac regni Hungariae vasallum) ad promissa servanda censuris ecclesiasticis cogant*).<sup>110</sup> However, in the confrontation with Daniel Galitsky, Alexander IV counted on other European rulers. It is indicated by the selection of ambassadors, who were instructed to bring the papal ultimatum to the duke-apostate. They were bishop Bruno of Olomouc and bishop Thomas of Wrocław.<sup>111</sup> Bruno von Schauenburg, who occupied the episcopal cathedra in Olmouc from 1245–1281, was one of the key agents of the papal influence in Czechia who did much to raise the profile and enhance the welfare of the Roman Church. Bishop Bruno became a close associate and chief adviser of the Czech king Przemysl Ottokar II (1253–1278). Extremely militant, he was also a skilled military leader who often led the royal troops personally. In 1254–1255 and 1267–1268, Bruno accompanied Ottokar in the Crusades to Prussia.<sup>112</sup> Another ambassador of the Pope, Wrocław bishop Thomas I Kozlovoroga (who held the cathedra in 1232–1268), was also one of the prelates most faithful to Rome. Having received education and a doctorate in Italy, he always maintained the closest contact with the papal curia. Bishop Thomas was one of the most prominent church leaders in Poland in the mid-13th century. He actively defended the interests of the Catholic Church in its relations with dukes, initiated the summoning of church synods of all Poland in Wrocław (1248, 1253, 1264 and 1267), and initiated and participated in the canonization of Bishop Stanislaus of Krakow (1253–1254), who

<sup>109</sup> „Quocirca fraternitati vestrae per a. s. m. quatenus si memoratus Rex praemissa neglexerit adimplere, vos eum ad id per censuram ecclesiasticam, appellatione postposita, compellatis, invocato nichilominus contra eundem Regem auxilio brachii saecularis“. – Athanasij G. Velykyj (ed.), *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae I* (see note 7), 51, nr. 35.

<sup>110</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum II*, 1370, nr. 16732.

<sup>111</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum II*, 1370, nr. 16732.

<sup>112</sup> See: Jan Libor, *Věrně po boku svého krále. Bruno ze Schaumburku*, in: *ibid.*, *Osobnosti moravských dějin I*, Brno 2006, 63–76.

became the most revered of all Polish saints.<sup>113</sup> Bruno von Shauenburg was associated with Daniel Galitsky by some kind of personal relationship which undoubtedly influenced the Pope's choice. In 1253, during the campaign of Daniel and allied Polish dukes to Moravia, described in detail in the Galicia-Volyn chronicle, a certain Gerbort surrendered to the Russian Duke („Gerbort sent Daniel his sword and humility“), thereby preventing any further advance of Russian-Polish troops „to Osoblog“.<sup>114</sup> Gerbort was probably a ruler of Fulshteyn castle, situated on the outskirts of city Osoblag (in district Bruntál in Moravian-Silesian region of Czechia).<sup>115</sup> On November 7, 1255, Bishop Bruno of Olomouc awarded Gerbort of Fulshteyn (Herbort von Füllenstein) – as his surveyor (Herbordo, dapifero suo) – several villages „as a compensation for damages from Vladislav, Duke of Opole“ (in restaurum damnorum a Wladislao, duce Opoliae), Daniel Galitsky's ally in the campaign of 1253.<sup>116</sup> In the early 1250s, Daniel Galitsky and his son Roman, by joining the fight for the legacy of the Austrian dukes, the Babenbergs, had to go to war with their main rival – the Czech king Przemysl Ottokar II.<sup>117</sup> Przemysl reported to Prandota, Bishop of Krakow, on the grave consequences of the invasion of Russian-Polish troops in Moravia in a letter dated July 20, 1255, and referred to the extensive damage to the outskirts of Opava (enormi laesione nostrarum terrarum praesertium Opaviensis), where the enemy operated, as well as numerous prisoners captured by the Hungarians, Kumans and Ruthenians (ab Ungaris et Chomanis etiam, seu Ruthenis).<sup>118</sup> Obviously, such claims Przemysl Ottokar could apply to Daniel of Galicia as well. Presumably, it was necessary for Bishop Bruno to remind the Russian Duke of these claims. Bishop of Olomouc, sent by Pope Alexander IV to Daniel Romanovich in February 1257, had just returned from a victorious campaign in East Prussia, in which he accompanied his king.<sup>119</sup> Bruno was one of the main organizers of this campaign, and in fact was responsible for its preparation: during 1253–1254 the Bishop of Warmia Anselm, and after him, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order Poppo von Ostern (1252–1256), came to Czechia specifically in order to conduct talks with the King and the Bishop of Olomouc.<sup>120</sup> Together with Ottokar, in early 1255, Bishop Bruno participa-

<sup>113</sup> See: Józef Mandziuk, *Historia Kościoła katolickiego na Śląsku I/1*, Warszawa 2003, 185–193.

<sup>114</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'* (see note 1), 825f.

<sup>115</sup> Vladimir T. Pashuto, *Očerki po istorii Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi* (see note 9), 257f. – See also: Nilolaj F. Kotljar, *Kommentarij* (see note 59), 288–291.

<sup>116</sup> Antonin Boček (ed.), *Codex diplomaticus et Epistolaris Moraviae III, Olomucii 1841*, 198–199, nr. 222; Joseph Emler (ed.), *Regesta Diplomatica nec non Epistolaria Bohemiae et Moraviae II, Prahae 1882*, 29, nr. 74. – See also: Beda Fr. Dudik, *Mährens allgemeine geschichte VI/3*, Brno 1870, 422.

<sup>117</sup> See: Alexander V. Maiorov, *Rus', Vizantija i Zapadnaja Evropa* (see note 75), 644f.

<sup>118</sup> Beda Fr. Dudik, *Archive im Königreiche Galizien und Lodomerien*, in: *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 39* (1868), 1–222, here 186–187.

<sup>119</sup> Peter de Dusburg, *Cronica terre Prussie*, ed. by Max Toeppen, in: *SRP 1*, Leipzig 1861, 3–269, here 90; Nicolaus von Jeroschin, *Kronike von Pruzinlant*, ed. by Ernst Strehlke, in: *Ibidem*, 291–648, here 417. – See also: Christian Krollmann, *Die deutsche Besiedlung des Ordenslandes Preussen*, in: *Prussia 29* (1931), 250–286, here 255.

<sup>120</sup> Antonin Boček (ed.), *Codex diplomaticus et Epistolaris Moraviae III*, nr. 202. – See also: Jaroslav Goll, *Čechy a Prusy ve středověku*, Praha 1897, 20; Marian Biskup, *Gerard Labuda, Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach*, Gdańsk 1988, 169; Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147–1254*, Leiden/Boston 2007, 224f.

ted in the foundation of the fortress Kralevets (Königsberg), founded where the Czech ascetic St. Wojciech (Adalbert) had died.<sup>121</sup> Bishop Thomas of Wrocław took part in organizing the crusade to Prussia. Ottokar's army went through Wrocław to the borders of Eastern Prussia and this city was chosen as the rallying point of the Crusaders' main forces.

„Coming to Wrocław – Ottokar's annals read – he [Przemysl Ottokar II. – A. M.] celebrated Christmas and was received by Polish dukes and nobles with great honor, and the Bishop of Wrocław with all the army was welcomed within a few days in a decent manner. While he was in Wrocław, he was joined by the margrave of Brandenburg with his army, and both advanced to Prussia, leading a great host“.<sup>122</sup>

The Dukes of Galicia-Volyn also participated in the crusade to Prussia in the middle of the 1250s which, undoubtedly, was the result of the union with Rome. In 1253–1255, troops belonging to Daniel Romanovich and his sons, in alliance with Duke Boleslaus the Shy of Krakow and Duke Zemovit of Mazowiec, subdued the Prussian tribe of Yatvingians, taking their chief town, called Paradise in the Galicia-Volyn Chronicle.<sup>123</sup> According to the Pope's plan, the bishops of Olomouc and Wrocław were to warn Daniel that his disobedience to Rome would lead to his exclusion from participation in the crusade to Prussia, and the inevitable loss of benefits offered by it. Indeed, after 1257, there is no information in the sources concerning any Daniel's involvement in Prussian affairs.<sup>124</sup> We do not know whether the private meeting in 1257, of Bishop Bruno and Daniel of Galicia took place. In any case, the meeting had to be postponed or held without Bishop Thomas. As early as 1256, the latter came into bitter conflict with the Silesian duke Boleslaus II of Rogatka over sharing diocesan income. Imposing an ecclesiastical curse on the Duke, the Bishop fled from Wrocław, but was captured and imprisoned for several months in Vlen' castle. Through the intercession of the other dukes, Bishop Thomas was released in April 1257.<sup>125</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear that Alexander IV's attempt to force the Duke of Galicia-Volyn to comply with the terms of the union failed. There is no evidence of further contacts between Daniel and Rome. Similarly, there is no evidence of any new contacts between Nicaea and the Pope until the Greek recovery of Constantinople in 1261.<sup>126</sup>

Alexander IV clearly foresaw such an outcome. Two days before issuing an ultimatum to Daniel, the Pope sent a bull to the Bishop of Lyubutsk, dated February 11, 1257, in which the Pontiff confirmed the Lyubutsk hierarch's ecclesiastical jurisdic-

<sup>121</sup> The name Königsberg (Kunigsbergk) was probably in honor of King Přemysl Otakar II. or in memory of the eponymous castle of the Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land (Hans Prutz, *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge*, Berlin 1883, 260; Carl Beckherra, *Geschichte Befestigungen von Königsberg*, in: *Altpreussische Monatsschrift* 27 (1890), 385–641, here 390).

<sup>122</sup> *Annales Otacariani a. 1254–1278*, ed. by Rudolf Köpke, in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores IX*, Hannoverae 1851, 181f.

<sup>123</sup> *Ipat'evskaja letopis'* (see note 1), 831–835.

<sup>124</sup> See: Natalija I. Shhaveleva, *Prusskij vopros v politike Daniila Galickogo*, in: *Drevnejšie gosudarstva Vostočnoj Evropy. Materialy i issledovanija*. 1991 god, Moscow 1994, 256–258.

<sup>125</sup> *Jana Długosza Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego VII*, ed. by Jan Dąbrowski, Warszawa 1974, 134.

<sup>126</sup> Petr I. Zhavoronkov, *Nikejskaja imperija i Zapad* (see note 19), 118.

tion in respect of the Russian lands.<sup>127</sup> Earlier, the Pope would not have dared to take such a step, in spite of the Bishop having requested it. The importance of Alexander's decision is explained by Mykola Chubatyj. Until the beginning of 1257, the Greek Rite Church hierarchy existed in the lands of Galicia-Volyn Rus', which recognized the supreme authority of the Pope, and therefore, according to the decision of the Fourth Lateran Council, the Latin hierarchy was unnecessary here. The resumption of Latin church jurisdiction meant, in effect, the actual termination of the union.<sup>128</sup>

In 1257, another bull was issued by Alexander IV, a summary of which is preserved in the papal Regesta without indicating the exact date. This message states that the Pope „grants the Crusaders who fought against the Tatars and the Ruthenians, absolution as well as those who participate in the campaign to Prussia and Livonia“.<sup>129</sup> The breakup of relations with the Pope in 1257 resulted in the Duke of Galicia-Volyn's rejection of restrictive obligations on foreign policy, particularly with regard to Austria. At the first opportunity, Daniel resumed his claim to „the Austrian Succession“ and the Hungarian king Béla IV, who at the time was recognized by the Pope as the ruler of Styria, once again became his ally.<sup>130</sup> In 1260, the Styrian knighthood opposed the Hungarian government and called on the Bohemian king Ottokar II Przemysl for help. The two kings began an armed conflict. In the decisive battle of July 12, 1260 near the village of Kressenbrunn (on the border between Austria and Hungary), Ottokar won a complete victory over Béla's forces.<sup>131</sup> We learn from the message of the Bohemian King to Pope Alexander IV, which has survived in the so-called Ottokar's annals (part of the Prague annals from the 13th century) and is the primary source of information about this battle, that the Russian dukes participated in the battle on the side of the Hungarians. Ottokar reports that he fought against Stephen [son of Béla IV. – A. M.] and Daniel, King of Russia, and his sons, and other Russians and Tatars who came to his aid, and Prince Bolesław of Krakow, and the young Leszek Lenchitsky, and countless inhumane people – the Cumans, and Hungarians, and various Slavs, Sicala and Wallachs, Besermyeny and Ismailis, and schismatics, namely Bulgarian, Russian and Bosnian heretics.<sup>132</sup> Daniel Romanovich's participation in the new Austrian campaign is confirmed by information in the Galicia-Volyn

<sup>127</sup> August Potthast (ed.), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* II, 1369, nr. 16726. – See full document: Alexander I. Turgenev (ed.), *Historia Russiae Monumenta* I, 83, nr. 94; Athanasij G. Velykyj (ed.), *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae* I (see note 7), 49, nr. 33.

<sup>128</sup> Mykola Chubatyj, *Zahidna Ukrajina i Rym* (see note 58), 65.

<sup>129</sup> Max Perlbach (ed.), *Preussische Regesten bis zum Ausgang des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Königsberg 1876, nr. 571; August Seraphim (ed.), *Preussisches Urkundenbuch. Politische Abtheilung* 1/2, Königsberg 1909, nr. 38.

<sup>130</sup> Jindřich Šebánek, Sáša Dušková (eds.), *Codex diplomaticus et epistolaris regni Bohemiae V/1*, Praha 1974, 59–60, nr. 21.

<sup>131</sup> This event is reported by almost all Austrian chronicles of the 13th century, see eg: *Continuatio Sancrucensis* II. a. 1234–1266, ed. by Wilhelm Wattenbach, in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores* IX, Hannoverae 1851, 644; *Continuatio Lambacensis*, ed. by Wilhelm Wattenbach, in: *Ibidem*, 560; *Continuatio Praedicatorum Vindobonensium*, ed. by Wilhelm Wattenbach, in: *Ibidem*, 728.

<sup>132</sup> Kosmova letopisu českého pokročovatele (Letopisy Česke od roku 1196 do roku 1278), in: Joseph Emler (ed.), *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum* II, Praha 1874, 291; *Kronika Jana z Marignoly*, in: Joseph Emler (ed.), *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum* III, Praha 1882, 315f.

chronicle and other sources which report that, due to the invasion of the South-Western Russia and Poland Minor by Burundai's troops (1259–1260), Daniel fled to Hungary and in 1260 was indeed at the court of Béla IV, along with Duke Bolesław the Shy of Krakow, who had also escaped from the Tatars.<sup>133</sup>

Thus, there is no basis on which to found Daniel Galitsky's coronation as evidence of a breakup of political and religious relations with Byzantium (Nicaea), in order to *escape* from the Byzantine Empire in the West. On the contrary, it is safe to assume that the history of the Duke of Galicia-Volyn's coronation and the union with Rome demonstrates the inextricable link of his foreign policy with the political course of Byzantium, which not only weakened after the events of 1204 but, apparently, was even strengthened during the decisive efforts of Nicaean rulers to recover Constantinople from Latin occupation.

### Abstract

Der Aufsatz betrachtet die Krönung von Daniil von Galich im Kontext der Geschichte der ersten Kirchenunion zwischen Rom und Russland. Es gibt keinen Grund, diese Entwicklungen als Beweis für die Beendigung der politischen und religiösen Beziehungen zum Byzantinischen Reich (Nizänisches Reich) – bzw. als eine „Flucht“ aus Byzanz in den Westen zu werten. Im Gegenteil ist sicher anzunehmen, dass die Geschichte der Krönung und der Vereinigung zeigt, dass die untrennbare Verbindung zwischen der fürstlichen Außenpolitik von Galizien-Volyn und dem politischen Kurs von Byzanz nicht nur von den Ereignissen von 1204 unbeeinträchtigt geblieben ist, sondern offenbar noch enger wurde, zumal diese Ereignisse in die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts fallen, also in die Zeit der entscheidenden Bemühungen der nizänischen Herrscher um die Rückeroberung Konstantinopels.

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<sup>133</sup> See: Natalija I. Shhaveleva, K istorii vtorogo nashestvija mongolo-tatar na Pol'shu, in: Lev V. Cherepnin (ed.), Vostochnaja Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekov'e, Moscow 1978, 307–314; Valerij Kovaljev, Cheshskij korol' Pshemysl Ottakar II i russkie knjaz'ja: vzaimnye kontakty na fone mezhdunarodnyh odnoszenij v Central'noj Evrope vtoroj poloviny XIII veka, in: Rusin 2 (2005), 55–68.