

Abtei Saint-Rambert lebte und von der Abtei unterhalten und geistlich betreut wurde. Bernhard erteilt ihm aus seiner reichen religiösen Erfahrung Ratschläge für seine Lebensgestaltung. Der Herausgeber hält diesen Brief für besonders wertvoll. Der zweite Brief Bernhards ist an die Nonnen der Abtei Saint-Pierre in Lyon gerichtet. Bernhard beglückwünscht sie zu der eben durchgeführten Reform und ermutigt sie in ihrem religiösen Streben. Der gemeinsame Brief des Priors Bernhard und der Mönche Johannes und Stephan ist an zwei Wohltäter der im Jahre 1132 errichteten Kartause Arvières, Aymon von Varennes und Aymon von Rohoria (Rovorée?), gerichtet. Er handelt über das im 12. Jahrhundert sehr beliebte Thema *De contemptu mundi*, die Weltentsagung und die Weihe an Gott im Ordensstand. Die folgenden fünf Briefe stammen von dem Mönch Johannes de Montemedio, der als Lehrer des geistlichen Lebens sehr angesehen war. Der erste der fünf Briefe ist an seinen Bruder Stephan gerichtet, dem er dringend empfiehlt, sich ihm anzuschließen. Er hatte damit Erfolg; denn Stephan war 1135 Novize in Portes. Der zweite Brief ist an den Mönch Latoldus der Kartause Meyriat gerichtet. Er gibt ihm praktische Anweisungen für das persönliche Gebet und legt ihm verschiedene Gebetsformulare vor. Der folgende Brief ist an den Mönch Hugo der Kartause Meyriat gerichtet. Er handelt dem Wunsch des Adressaten gemäß über die Danksagung für die Wohltaten Gottes. Der nächste Brief ist an einen nicht näher bekannten Mönch Berard gerichtet. Er handelt über die „Wache des Herzens“ (*de custodia cordis*). Ausgehend von der alten Einteilung der menschlichen Natur in Leib, Seele und Geist (vgl. 1 Thess 5,23) spricht er von der Unterwerfung des Leibes und der Seele unter den Geist und unter Gott. Der folgende Brief ist an einen Neffen Bernhard gerichtet, der Mönch einer anderen Kartause war. Er hatte Zweifel an seiner Berufung. Johannes sieht darin nur Versuchungen des Teufels und fordert ihn zur Beharrlichkeit auf. Der letzte der neun Briefe stammt von dem Mönch Stephan von Chalmet, der wahrscheinlich mit dem späteren Prior Stephan von Portes (1171) identisch ist. Der Brief ist an die Novizen des Klosters Saint-Sulpice gerichtet, das ursprünglich ein Priorat des Klosters Cluny war, sich unter dem Prior Humbert für die Lebensweise der Kartäuser interessierte, sich aber schließlich für den Orden von Cîteaux entschied. Stephan warnt seine Korrespondenten vor der Versuchung, ihren Orden zu ändern und mahnt zur Beharrlichkeit im Dienste Gottes.

Die Briefe sind Zeugnisse eines blühenden religiösen Lebens in dem jungen Kartäuserkloster Portes und in zahlreichen Klöstern der Umgebung in der ersten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts.

*Eichstätt*

L. Ott

Willigis Eckermann: *Wort und Wirklichkeit. Das Sprachverständnis in der Theologie Gregors von Rimini und sein Weiterwirken in der Augustinerschule* (= Cassiciacum 33). Würzburg (Augustiner-Verlag) 1978. XXXI, 338 S.

Gregory of Rimini has long been viewed as one of the most significant contributors to the medieval understanding of propositions and to the interrelation of language and reality. His name is inseparably linked with a particular theory on the object of knowledge known as the "complexe significabile", whose meaning and influence received extensive examination in Hubert Elie's *Le Complexe Significabile* (1936) and Gabriel Nuchelmans' *Theories of the Proposition* (1973). It is to this theme that Eckermann's book is directed. He has provided not only the most thorough treatment of this area of Gregory's thought, but he has considerably modified our understanding of Gregory's influence in late medieval propositional theory.

Eckermann's work is divided into six chapters. The first presents the historical and historiographical background. The author gives a brief overview of thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century opinion up through William of Ockham, followed by a survey of the various interpretations of the problem and of Gregory's contribution. Although both sections of this chapter are well done, they leave the reader with an incomplete picture. Only through Eckermann's review of the secondary literature does one realize that

there were an number of important contributions to the problem during the more than two decades that separate Ockham and Rimini. But the failure to include those contributions in the first section leaves the impression, mitigated somewhat by later acknowledgement of Crathorn's importance, that the sources that stimulated Gregory's thought and that caused him to develop his ideas were essentially limited to Ockham and pre-fourteenth-century authors. Had Eckermann's survey of past scholarship included Michalski and Moody, the importance of Walter Chatton might have been acknowledged, for on this issue Robert Holcot was in debate with *both* Crathorn and Chatton in addition to modifying Ockham's approach. Unfortunately, the most important piece of evidence on the background and sources for Gregory's treatment of the object of knowledge appeared when Eckermann's book was already in press: Gedeon Gal's "Adam of Wodeham's Question on the 'Complexe significabile' as the immediate object of scientific knowledge", *Franciscan Studies*, 37 (1977), 66–102. The text published there makes clear Rimini's indebtedness to Wodeham for the theory of the "complexe significabile". In combination with Gregory's knowledge of Chatton and his probable familiarity with Crathorn and Holcot, it becomes apparent that Gregory was influenced as much by English authors since Ockham as by Ockham himself.

Chapters two through four contain the heart of Eckermann's study: the analysis and evaluation of Gregory's position. Here the reader is treated to painstaking and precise scholarship of the highest quality. Chapter two presents Gregory's view of language, both verbal and mental. Eckermann examines Gregory's understanding of spoken and written statements, his view of the word, his distinction between the *significatum*, *significabile*, and *enuntiable*, the conclusion and total significate as the object of knowledge, the creation of meaning, the relation of sentence and significate, and finally the Stoic and Augustinian backgrounds to Gregory's understanding of these issues.

Chapter three is concerned with Gregory's treatment of external reality, both created and uncreated. Under the former and against the background of Augustine and Thomas, Eckermann provides an extensive examination of Gregory's teaching on species and universals. Under the latter the knowledge of God is treated. Chapter four brings together language and reality, the interrelation of mental language, verbal expression, species, concepts, and external truth that contribute to the process of knowledge.

Chapter five examines the influence of and reactions to Gregory's approach to language and the theory of the object of knowledge associated with his name: the "complexe significabile". Although Eckermann is familiar with the reactions of Andrew of Neufchateau, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and Pierre d'Ailly as discussed in the works of Elie and Nuchelmans, he largely confines his own attention to the Augustinian Hermits, specifically Hugolino of Orvieto, Bonsembiante Badoer, John Hiltalingen of Basel, Simon of Cremona, Dionysius of Montina, Angelus of Döbeln, Peter Gracilis, Augustinus Favaroni, Thomas of San Genesio, Paul of Venice, and Bartholomew Arnoldi of Usingen. This chapter is particularly valuable, since of those figures only Hugolino, Bonsembiante, and Paul of Venice had received attention from previous scholars on this issue. In contrast to the earlier scholarship, Eckermann establishes that Gregory's theory, when seen as part of a larger analysis of language, meaning, and truth, had far more positive influence than has generally been attributed to it. Even those Austin Friars who were critical of Gregory in this area, such as John Hiltalingen of Basel or Paul of Venice, adopted some aspects of his approach and thinking. The sixth and final chapter brings together Eckermann's conclusions and observations.

*Wort und Wirklichkeit* is a major contribution to our understanding of Gregory of Rimini and the fourteenth-century discussions on the object of knowledge and belief. For the area it covers it goes well beyond the works of Elie and Nuchelmans. The thrust of the book is not seriously undermined by the subsequent discovery that the theory of the "complexe significabile" was developed earlier by Adam Wodeham in his London lectures and taken by Gregory either from that source or from Wodeham's *Lectura secunda* where it also occurs. In contrast to Wodeham's Oxford lectures, neither the London lectures nor the *Lectura secunda* circulated widely on the Continent, and Gregory's margins did not reveal he borrowed the idea from Wodeham. Thus, as far as the

Continent is concerned, one can validly trace the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of the idea after Gregory as if it came from Gregory alone.

The richness and value of the book lie as much in the extensive footnotes and lengthy citations as in the body of the main argument and analysis. In fact, some of the points Eckermann does not dwell on but only mentions in passing are as important as some of his major conclusions. For example, the texts cited on p. 273 reveal that Döbeln completely misunderstood the meaning of the phrase "de virtute sermonis" as well as supposition theory. One would like to know whether he was unique in that regard or whether such errors were common in the second half of the fourteenth century. More serious is the failure to highlight sufficiently John Klenkok's critique of Gregory or the role played by the Cistercian theologian, Gottschalk of Nepomuk, whose contribution is buried in a footnote. By confining his treatment to the Austin theologians and, of that group, only those who have left treatments of the question, the full picture of the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Gregory's theory of knowledge and language, in particular the history of the "complexe significabile", is not revealed. That history depends on the close intellectual and textual association of the Austin Friars and the Cistercians at Paris, noted by Damasus Trapp a quarter century ago. It was on the basis of the criticisms raised by Klenkok and Gottschalk in the years before 1365 that led Hiltalinger and Döbeln to reject certain aspects of Gregory's theory. Moreover, the most influential response to Gottschalk came not from an Austin theologian but from a Cistercian, James of Eltville, reading at Paris around 1369–70, whose commentary was later reread by (and by Eckermann, pp. 307–8, credited to) Henry of Langenstein. The Eltville/Langenstein defense lived on in memory but not effectiveness. Beginning with the last two decades of the fourteenth century both Austins and secular theologians abandoned Gregory's theory, many of them returning to Ockham's formulation.

A few other *desiderata* can be mentioned. Eckermann's discussion of Favaroni (pp. 279–296), interesting as it is in its own right, goes well beyond the topic at hand and distracts the reader from the main issue. In the early sections of the book insufficient attention is given to the centrality of the idea of mental language in Ockham, and the topic is presented as if the idea was primarily developed by Gregory. Finally, it would have been useful to present and future readers if the citations to Ockham had been given to the volumes of the new critical edition that were then available, particularly the *Summa logicae* (1974). But these things do not significantly detract from a book that, more than any other on this topic, carries the reader into the heart of Gregory's argument and the meaning of his achievement.

Madison

William J. Courtenay

La Passion des Jongleurs, Texte établi d'après la Bible des sept estaz du monde de Geufroi de Paris. Edition critique, introduction, notes et glossaire par Anne Joubert Amari Perry (= Textes Dossiers Documents 4), Paris 1981 (Beauchesne).

Die altfranzösische ‚Passion des Jongleurs‘, ein in Achtsilbern (Paarreim) verfaßtes anonymes Erzählgedicht („poème narratif“), das die Hauptquelle der französischen Passionsspiele ist (30: „la PJ constitue le point de départ de la grande tradition de la passion dramatique“), wird in die Zeit um 1200 datiert. Geufroi de Paris fügte das Werk seiner riesigen geschichtstheologischen Kompilation aus dem Jahre 1243 ein (‚Bible des sept estaz du monde‘, B. N. f. fr. 1526). Die literarische und religiös-didaktische Bedeutung, die der PJ zugeschrieben wird, schlägt sich in mindestens 26 Handschriften (vorwiegend 13./14. Jahrhundert) nieder.

Die 1980 durch einen tragischen Unfall verstorbene Herausgeberin hatte es sich in ihrer Dissertation (Emory University 1978) zum Ziel gesetzt, die beiden älteren Editionen der PJ (Hermann Theben, Greifswald 1909 [V. 1–1544]; Erich Pfuhl, Greifswald 1909 [V. 1545–3328] – Frances Foster, London 1916), die teils fehlerhaft oder unvollständig sind, teils die kommentierende Erörterung der Details und literaturgeschichtlichen Zu-